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CROWDFUNDING CAPITAL IN THE AGE OF
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED TOKENS
PATRICIA H. LEE†
INTRODUCTION
Less than three years ago, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) adopted investment crowdfunding
regulations (“Reg. CF”) to facilitate small companies’ efforts to
raise capital and jumpstart employment.1 Reg. CF provides
with potentially one of the most disruptive
companies2
transformations in capital markets.3 Its potential has been
lauded as a possible vehicle to democratize capital formation and
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1
See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232, et al. (2018) [hereinafter SEC
Crowdfunding Act]; adopted pursuant to the Jumpstart Our Business Companies
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, Title III, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) [hereinafter
JOBS Act].
2
The term “company” represents small companies that provide notice filings
under Reg. CF, notwithstanding the actual entity classification, e.g. limited liability
company or partnership.
3
William Hinman, Director, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC, Remarks at
the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto: Digital Asset Transactions: When
Howey Met Gary (Plastic) (June 14, 2018) (“Some people believe that this technology
will transform e-commerce as we know it.”); Christine Hurt, Pricing
Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOS, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
217, 220 (2015). See also Howard Marks, How Crowdfunding is Disrupting VCs,
FORBES (June 10, 2018, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardmarks/2018/
06/10/how-crowdfunding-is-disrupting-vcs/#4a105f174823.
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to decentralize investments by way of the Internet.4 This method
of companies crowdfunding securities through intermediaries
(“broker dealers” or “funding portals”) and offering the securities
for sale to the general public is referred to as “investment
crowdfunding.”5
Scholars have raised numerous questions about the
companies, the investments, and the costs of offerings before and
after adoption of Reg. CF.6 Various questions and concerns
raised include whether: (1) companies would refrain from using
this newly crafted exemption in light of the regulatory complexity

4
Seth C. Oranburg, Democratizing Startups, 68 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1065–
66 (2016) (recommending a resale exemption to avoid subjecting small stockholders
to the risk of fraud-on-the-market and to limit disclosure requirements). See also
Lenore Palladino, Democratizing Investment (May 15, 2018) (unpublished paper) (on
file
with Franklin & Eleanor
Roosevelt Insitute, Smith College),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3194693# (arguing that “[i]f
portals act as connectors rather than thick intermediaries, small investors could, in
theory, gain more of the wealth flowing from private companies”).
5
Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (last updated Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/info/small
bus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm#_ftn1. In order to act as an intermediary in
a transaction involving the offer or sale of securities in reliance on § 4(a)(6) of the
Securities Act, an organization is required to register—either as a broker-dealer
under § 15(b) of the Exchange Act or as a funding portal pursuant to § 4A(a)(1) of
the Securities Act. These funding portals can register with the SEC on Form
Funding Portal and can be a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, limited
liability company, or other organized entity acting as an intermediary in
crowdfunding transactions. Id. The funding portal must also become a member of
FINRA. See Funding Portals We Regulate, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about/
funding-portals-we-regulate (last visited Feb. 26, 2019); see also Forms List, U.S.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/forms (last visited Feb. 16, 2019)
(additional information for registration, amendments, and withdrawal are set out in
Instructions for Forms, available at http://www.sec.gov/forms and in text of the
rules).
6
Reza Dibadj, Crowdfunding Delusions, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 15, 27–29, 39
(2015) (arguing that crowdfunding at these costs is a “dismal idea”). See also Jack
Wroldsen, Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 543, 551
(2017) (discussing inherent risks of crowdfunding investments, including “inherent
uncertainty and high likelihood of failure of early-stage start-up companies,”
sophistication of ordinary investors; and fraud running rampant); Lynnise E.
Phillips Pantin, The Wealth Gap and the Racial Disparities in the Startup
Ecosystem, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 447 (2018) (“[C]urrent capital raising schemes
available to entrepreneurs may not be enough to meaningfully narrow the racial
wealth divide . . . .”); David Groshoff, Equity Crowdfunding as Economic
Development?, 38 CAMPBELL L. REV. 317, 337 (2016) (the SEC’s inability to protect
investors from investment fraud); Garry A. Gabison, Equity Crowdfunding: All
Regulated but Not Equal, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 359, 362 (2015) (concerns
about fraud and incompetence).
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and exorbitant costs;7 (2) the investment offering quality would
jeopardize the offerings or keep investors away; (3) investors
would fall prey to purchasing inappropriate securities;8 (4) Reg.
CF might become the “go to” exemption for companies with poor
credit ratings;9 and, (5) alternative financing would render Reg.
CF of little effect.10 Before the regulations were adopted,
Christine Hurt further asked the question: “which types of
entrepreneurs and funding models will survive and thrive under
a new crowdfunding regime?”11
As the lion’s share of securities offered are under public
offerings or other safe harbor exemptions, the outcomes and
impacts of Reg. CF small business offerings are not studied,
monitored or amplified to the same extent as larger offerings.
The line of inquiry in this Article is the scope of Reg. CF,
including questions about the level of company participation,
the types of businesses seeking capital formation, and the quality
of the investments offered. Furthermore, to what extent has Reg.
CF investment crowdfunding facilitated company capital
formation and provided a means for investors to purchase
suitable investments? Towards that end, the author retrieved
data from SEC Form C notice filings and other SEC filings
completed by companies beginning with Reg. CF’s adoption date
through June 30, 2018.12 Additionally, company websites were
7

Dibadj argues that offerings in excess of $500,000 were less discouraging, and
predicts that “crowdfunding will have precious little impact.” Dibadj, supra note 6,
at 41. See also Patricia H. Lee, Access to Capital or Just More Blues? Issuer Decisionmaking Post SEC Crowdfunding Regulation, 18 TENN. J. BUS. L. 19, 68–69 (2016)
(suggesting that high regulatory costs, liability and public disclosure compliance
requirements may deter some companies from seeking capital through Reg. CF
financing methods).
8
Dibadj, supra note 6, at 40–41.
9
Lee, supra note 7, at 70.
10
Id. at 64–67.
11
Hurt, supra note 3, at 221.
12
Edgar Company Filings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) (company Form
C, C/A, C-U, C-W filings and registrations were retrieved and reviewed here); Form
C, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/files/formc.pdf, (last visited Feb.
16, 2019). With respect to company Reg. CF offerings: Form C/A is the method to
amend an offering; Form C-U is the filing to announce the success or failure of an
offering after the closing date; Form C-W is the form to withdraw the filing before
the closing date. These forms encompassed the dataset utilized. See also Constance
Z. Wagner, Securities Fraud in Cyberspace: Reaching the Outer Limits of the Federal
Securities Laws, 80 NEB. L. REV. 920, 924 (2001) (explaining that the SEC has
allowed Edgar Filings since 1984 to permit companies to electronically file disclosure
documents under the 1933, 1934 Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940).
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reviewed to compare and contrast the data filed with the SEC,
primarily for updates.
Two clarifications about the usage of the term “investment
crowdfunding” should be noted. First, scholars refer to this type
of financing method in several other ways: equity crowdfunding,13
securities crowdfunding,14 investor crowdfunding,15 and securities
crowdsourcing.16 As the focus of this Article is on both a
company’s attempt to formulate capital and the suitability of
securities for investors, the term investment crowdfunding seems
most appropriate in this context.
Second, investment
crowdfunding could also be used to refer to crowdfunding
campaigns that are offered under other 1933 Act exemptions or
to international campaigns.17
In this Article, the term
investment crowdfunding is primarily used to discuss Reg. CF
exemption campaigns hosted in the United States.
In light of the research, the Article makes several assertions.
First, the progress of investment crowdfunding is neither dismal,
nor a resounding success. Rather, the change is more a mix of
positive and troubling developments. The data reviewed and
retrieved provides positives regarding participation, funding
portal expansion, and the fact that some companies raised
capital.
Furthermore, there has been growth in the
13

Joan MacLeod Heminway, Selling Crowdfunded Equity: A New Frontier, 70
OKLA. L. REV. 189, 194 (2017). However, Professor Heminway further points out
“that, not every crowdfunded offering of a profit-sharing instrument or interest is
equity crowdfunding.” Id. at 194. See also Gabison, supra note 6, at 362 (equity
crowdfunding); Groshoff, supra note 6, at 334.
14
Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 885, 889 (2018). The terminology “securities crowdfunding” is a good descriptor,
except that the term, gives focus to the securities and not the whole transaction,
which conceivably is an investment from a shareholder’s perspective. The use of the
term “equity crowdfunding” appears limiting as companies can seek debt,
convertible or equity financing. The opposite concern surrounds using the term
“securities crowdsourcing,” which implies a broader context but is narrowed by
putting “securities” in front of the broader term crowdsourcing.
15
Hurt, supra note 3, at 234 (“Both equity crowdfunding and debt crowdfunding
with an expectation of interest offer a return on a backer’s investment above and
beyond a thank you card or DVD . . . .”).
16
Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Crowdsourcing: Markets for
Labor, Rewards, and Securities, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 35, 47 (2015).
17
See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 889 (“Securities crowdfunding, while born in
the United States, has become a worldwide phenomenon, with New Zealand leading
the charge.”); Anton Didenko, Regulating FinTech: Lessons from Africa, 19 SAN
DIEGO INT'L L.J. 311, 313 (2018) (discussing crowdfunding in Kenya and South
Africa); KIM WALES, PEER-TO-PEER LENDING AND EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: A GUIDE
TO THE NEW CAPITAL MARKETS FOR JOB CREATORS, INVESTORS, AND
ENTREPRENEURS 218 ( 2018).
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crowdfunding of Reg. CF securities, and in the sale of digital
tokens based on blockchain technology (also known as
“distributed ledger technology,” or “DLT”).18
At the same time, the Article notes some troubling inferences
about investment crowdfunding company offerings generally, and
digital token offerings, more specifically. For example, the
expansion of securities (i.e. digital tokens and coins) offered to
investors may present risks for both investors and the
companies.19 Reg. CF digital token offerings reliant on the
blockchain are complex, uncertain, and speculative securities,
which raise doubts about the likelihood of an investor’s return on
an investment. Some companies have not been successful with
their digital token offerings, with cancelled offerings rather than
capital raised. Although funding portals are growing, the
downside is that funding portals are typically located in limited
parts of the country and have limited liability. Many areas of the
country are not participating in Reg. CF capital formation. Thus,
unless a company in such an area utilizes an alternative means
of financing, they may not have access to capital for their
emerging enterprise. The foregoing suggests that we are not yet
close to fulfilling the goals of capital formation, let alone job
creation under the current regulatory scheme.
Insights from the research suggest that this topic is more
nuanced than initially apparent, because the larger market of
initial coin offerings (“ICO”) is represented by well-publicized
ICOs which have the greatest volume of transactions when
compared to Reg. CF digital tokens.20 That being said, ICOs are
being closely monitored by the SEC, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”).21
However, Reg. CF blockchain-based
offerings are not monitored in the same way since companies file
the required and periodic notices with the SEC including
18
See KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF
TRUST 49 (2018) (“Cryptocurrency enthusiasts envision digital tokens as being
widely accepted for all sorts of financial payments by people around the world, as
credit cards are.”). See also, Jay G. Baris & Joshua Ashley Klayman, Blockchain
Basics for Investment Managers: A Token of Appreciation, 51 REV. SEC. AND
COMMODITIES REG. 67, 68 (2018).
19
See infra Part I.C.
20
See infra Part I.A.
21
See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial
Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS
L.J. 463, 465 (2019) (“[T]he Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and its
counterparts in other jurisdictions have turned their attention to token sales.”).
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disclosure documents that include the predictions of risk
affiliated with the offerings.
To illustrate the findings, this Article proceeds like so. Part
I provides a brief history of the Reg. CF exemption law and the
research findings about investment crowdfunding, generally, and
digital tokens, more specifically. Next, Part II provides insights
on the current state of offering blockchain-based digital tokens to
unsophisticated investors and the silver linings in the data.
Finally, Part III provides recommendations for a path forward in
Reg. CF. First, the SEC should re-evaluate its regulatory policy
in light of the proliferation of blockchain-based token offerings
and gaps in funding portals, and provide additional warnings to
unsophisticated investors who may be taking on enhanced
investment risk. The uncertainty and risk of digital tokens
reliant on blockchain technology foretells a troubling high risk of
investment loss, which may supplement the expected high risk of
loss for startup tech companiees.
Second, companies,
particularly idealistic tech startups, that are considering the
offer of digital tokens, should thoughtfully consider alternatives
to these offerings. There remains a level of uncertainty and risk
in these offerings, which could result in greater risk and liability
than the alternative financing available to them.
Lastly,
economic development organizations should consider developing
their role in attracting, designing, and implementing funding
portals to provide the support that tech and other startup
companies need to raise capital for their business.
I.
A.

REG. CF LAW AND DIGITAL TOKENS

Capital Formation

Historically, raising capital was a pathway for large, wellestablished enterprises. One way larger enterprises raised large
amounts of capital was through traditional public offerings of
securities under the 1933 Act. Prior to Reg. CF, companies that
sought to offer securities had several options. First, they could
register securities pursuant to the 1933 Act, which provides a
statutory framework for the federal regulation of securities
offerings. Registration would be cost prohibitive for smaller
companies.22 Second, companies could seek one of several safe
harbor exemptions discussed further in this Section. The other
22

See Lee, supra note 7, at 67.
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traditional way of raising capital is pursuant to various
exemptions under the 1933 Act, discused herein. Third, the
company could avoid offering securities and consider a host of
other funding alternatives.23
“Crowdfunding is the use of the Internet or other means to
raise money . . . in small amounts from a large number of
contributors to support a wide range of ideas and ventures.”24
Investment crowdfunding is the younger sibling of the
crowdfunding of ideas, goods, and services offered to the public.
Investment crowdfunding started with Title III of the Crowdfund
Act. This Act amended the 1933 Act and allowed companies25 to
offer and sell up to $1 million of unregistered equity securities in
a twelve-month period, without registering them.26 The SEC
raised the cap on exempted transactions to allow companies to
raise $1.07 million in 2017.27
The normative goal of the
Crowdfund Act was to encourage small business growth and
promote employment, specifically to “help entrepreneurs raise
the capital they need to put Americans back to work and create
an economy that’s built to last.”28 The Crowdfund Act aimed to
lower regulatory hurdles for companies trying to go public and
to allow firms to have more private shareholders.29 The
Crowdfund Act further promised to provide issuers the ability to

23

See generally WALES, supra note 17; see also Lee, supra note 7, at 50–66.
RICHARD A. MANN & BARRY S. ROBERTS, ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS LAW AND
THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 799 (Cengage, 13th ed., 2017); see also Jason W. Parsont,
Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 283
(2014) (describing crowdfunding as a “financing method used primarily by startups
and small businesses to raise small amounts of capital from a large number of
people over the Internet”); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the
Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 477 n.1
(2014).
25
The Crowdfund Act would allow eligible, domestic, nonpublic issuers to raise
up to $1.07 million as of 2017 (a figure that would be periodically adjusted for
inflation). Investor Bulletin: Crowdfunding Investment Limits Increase, U.S. SEC.
AND EXCH. COMM’N (May 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-andbulletins/ib_crowdfundingincrease.
26
JOBS Act, supra note 1, § 302.
27
In the first year, the SEC capped the investments at $1 million and raised the
cap to $1.07 million in 2017. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1) (2018).
28
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama
to Sign Jumpstart Our Business Companies (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/president-obamasign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act); see also Oranburg, supra note 4, at
1030 (discussing the goals of the Crowdfund Act).
29
Regulation A+ (REG A+), NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/regulation-a (last
visited Feb. 17, 2019).
24
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access investors via the Internet with the aid of funding portals.
Schwartz described the goals as a quest for efficiency, on the one
hand, and a quest for inclusiveness on the other.30
Registering securities or offering securities under a safe
harbor exemption would be necessary to avoid violating § 5 of the
1933 Act.31 Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the 1933 Act generally
prohibit any person, including broker-dealers, from using the
mails or interstate means to sell or offer to sell, either directly or
indirectly, any security unless a registration statement is in
effect or has been filed with the Commission as to the offer and
sale of such security, or an exemption from the registration
provisions applies.32 For this reason, companies seeking to avoid
complications under the securities laws must register or find an
allowable safe harbor exemption. The next Section provides a
brief overview of the SEC’s adoption of Reg. CF and the
differences between the legal and economic requirements of Reg.
CF filings and other 1933 Act safe harbor exemptions.33
1.

What is Reg. CF?

The idea of offering securities in small amounts to a large
number of participants is not only novel, but is also becoming a
disruptive financial and technological innovation.
This
disruption is precipitated, in part, by the SEC’s implementation
of the Crowdfund Act and, in part, due to a variety of external
factors. In a very nascent way, Reg. CF was a positive step
towards democratizing investment markets and decentralizing
access to capital.34 In light of the intersection of e-commerce and

30

See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 893.
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012); Responses to Frequently
Asked Questions About a Broker-Dealer’s Duties When Relying on the Securities Act
Section 4(a)(4) Exemption to Execute Customer Orders, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N
(Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-broker-dealer-dutysection4.htm (“Section 5 of the Securities Act requires all offers and sales of
securities in interstate commerce to be registered, unless an exemption from
registration is available.”). For cases establishing a prima facia case, see SEC v.
Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 121 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006), SEC v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1215
(11th Cir. 2004), SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).
32
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a),(c).
33
This research does not include a discussion on intrastate offerings of
securities.
34
Society’s ability to democratize and to decentralize access to capital is a
question that scholars will research in the upcoming years.
31
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social media, scholars have considered such crowdfunding moves
to represent “populist, Internet-based business finance.”35
Reg. CF allows small, undercapitalized companies to engage
in crowdfunding capital formation. To that end, Reg. CF set
forth structures, compliance requirements, restrictions,
responsibilities, and costs, to allow for smaller equity
investments. Reg. CF facilitates the raising of capital from the
general public through the sale of securities,36 provides
opportunities for companies37 to utilize internet funding portals,
and helps to locate members of the public willing to invest.38 The
Crowdfund Act and the Reg. CF exemption brought the promise
of “a new, unregistered, wide-reaching brand of securities
offering . . . that, together with other changes in U.S. securities
regulation, may become a new gateway to public securities
markets.”39
Through Reg. CF, U.S. companies that are not already
Exchange Act reporting companies are allowed to raise up to
$1.07 million in a twelve-month period, allow the solicitation of
their shares, and exempt the offering from SEC and state
securities law registration.40 Such measures have joined a host of
other developments that have collectively opened the floodgates
of crowdfunding investment. For example, Congress has allowed
companies to raise money and offer shares to the general public,
not just to accredited or sophisticated investors.
In addition to Reg. CF, Congress also enacted Reg. A+ in the
JOBS Act.41 In furtherance of legislative goals, Reg. CF, Reg. A,
and the amended Reg. A+, provided new opportunities for small
35
See Heminway, supra note 13, at 193; see also Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon
Walker, The Global Significance of Crowdfunding: Solving the SME Funding
Problem and Democratizing Access to Capital, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 347, 357,
366 (2016) (“The rise of websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—websites
generally associated with the emergence of Web 2.0—as well as the popular payment
services site PayPal, enabled crowdfunding to gain greater visibility.”).
36
See, e.g.,17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3 (2018); Parsont, supra note 24, at 282.
37
Of the 1,112 companies that filed Form C’s to register securities, four had
principal offices outside of the United States and those locations included: Armenia,
Spain, Kenya and the United Kingdom. See infra Part I.C and accompanying data.
38
See infra Part I.C.
39
See Heminway, supra note 13, at 205; see also Andrew A. Schwartz,
Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2013) (“Securities
crowdfunding is a new idea, modeled on the recently introduced and highly
successful concept of ‘reward’ crowdfunding, which is practiced on Kickstarter,
IndieGoGo, and other websites.”).
40
Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 5.
41
17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2018) (explaining the scope of the exemption).
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businesses to attract the financing they needed to run their
businesses.42 The basic details about each regulation are briefly
set forth below. Under the regulatory regimes, the definition of
“security” is based on the broadly worded provision of § 2(a)(1) of
the 1933 Act, which states:
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based
swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a “security,” or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.43

Effective June 2015, the SEC amended Reg. A and
authorized Reg. A+ to allow a U.S. or Canadian company two
types of greater funding opportunities, set forth as either Tier
1 or Tier 2 offerings.44 For Tier 1 offerings, companies can
raise up to $20 million in a twelve-month period, with no more
than $6 million in offers by selling to security-holders that are
affiliates.45 For Tier 2, companies are allowed to raise up to
$50 million in a twelve-month period using a public
solicitation of their shares, with no more than $15 million to
affiliates, and to exempt the offering from SEC and state
securities law registration.46
There are also basic requirements applicable to both Tier 1
and Tier 2 offerings, including, among others, company eligibility
requirements, bad actor disqualification provisions, and
disclosure requirements. Additional requirements apply to Tier

42

Anzhela Knyazeva, Regulation A+: What Do We Know So Far?, 2–7 (Nov.
2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/Knyazeva_RegulationA%20.pdf.
43
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
44
See Knyazeva, supra note 42, at 1–3 (Regulation A, amended June 19, 2015,
provides an exemption from registration for certain small issues).
45
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1).
46
See id. § 230.251(a)(2); see also Knyazeva, supra note 42, at 3 n.10.
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2 offerings, including limitations on the amount of money a nonaccredited investor may invest in a Tier 2 offering, requirements
for audited financial statements, and the filing of ongoing
reports.47 Issuers of Tier 2 offerings are not required to register
or qualify their offerings with state securities regulators.
However, “resales of securities purchased in a Tier 2 offering that
do not meet the condition of one of the exemptions from state
registration must be registered with state securities
regulators.”48
2.

How Reg. CF Differs from Other Exempt and Nonexempt
Offerings

a.

1933 Act Offerings49

Reg. CF filings and 1933 Act offerings differ significantly.
Other than involving the same three discernable players—a
company, a funding portal, and an investor—there is not much
similarity between these methods of offering securities.
Differences include transaction structure and size, investment
research availability, liquidity, market share, exchange systems,
and the types of securities offered. First and foremost is the cost.
In a 1933 Act public offering, the costs start at $4.2 million in
offering costs directly attributable to the IPO, plus underwriter
fees equal to 4% to 7% of gross proceeds.50
Pursuant to Reg. CF, for the first time, small investors are
allowed to buy small dollar amounts of unregistered securities
from companies. The SEC’s threshold bifurcates investors into
47

Knyazeva, supra note 42, at 3 n.8.
Id. at 26 n.59 (citing Securities Act Rules, Questions and Answers of General
Applicability, Question 182.10, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm (last updated Nov. 6,
2017)).
49
Registration under the 1933 Act includes registering a set of documents,
including a prospectus, which are filed with the SEC before an entity goes public and
quarterly and annual reports after the entity goes public. See Registration Under the
Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (last updated Sept. 2, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis33htm.html. See also Alexander F.
Cohen, Financial Statement Requirements in US Securities Offerings, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harv
ard.edu/2017/02/05/financial-statement-requirements-in-us-securities-offerings/.
50
Considering
an
IPO
to
fuel
your
company’s
future?,
PWC,
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/library/cost-of-an-ipo.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2019); see also Jay Preston, Note, Initial Coin Offerings: Innovation,
Democratization and the SEC, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 318, 328 (2018) (estimating
between $4 and $28 million).
48
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two categories: those who have more than $100,000 in income
and those with less than $100,000. The SEC further clarified
that if both an investor’s income and net worth are less than
$100,000, then the amount invested could not exceed $2,000 or
5% of their net worth—whichever is greater.51 However, there is
no floor to the income and net worth, with issuers relying on
their funding portals to assess investor limits and
qualifications.52 The securities offered continue to be of high risk
with provisions that seemingly protect companies more than the
investors.
Reg. CF investors have a one-year restriction on the resale of
Reg. CF and other restricted stock purchased from other safe
harbor transactions.
The reasonableness of these resale
restrictions continues to be debated. Legal scholars have argued
that allowing companies to sell stock through crowdfunding and
mini-IPOs is not enough—securities regulations must allow
investors to resell that stock.53
Oranburg makes three
arguments to support the view that more liquidity is
fundamental to meet the normative goals of crowdfunding. First,
investors are discouraged from investing because they do not
have a way to liquidate their stock easily in a resale market.54
Second, capital continues to be consolidated in more mature
companies instead of young organizations.55 Third, wealthy and
influential investors can resell large blocks of stock and can do so
The liquidity is also
in secret trading environments.56
problematic for investors, as there may not be a ready and
available market for their newly purchased security. Oranburg’s
solution is to call for a “144B” venture-exchange safe harbor, in

51
See Dibadj, supra note 6, at 23 (noting that the SEC “bifurcates investors into
two categories: those whose annual income or net worth is less than $100,000 and
those whose annual income or net worth is at or above that amount”).
52
See Dibadj, supra note 6, at 24 (noting that the issuer may rely on the
intermediary to assess these limits).
53
See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1015–16. See also, Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359, 2399 (1998).
54
See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1015–1016.
55
See id.
56
See id. Oranburg defines dark-pool markets as trading markets available and
known to very few investors and further notes that these dark-pool markets are
“private stock markets that are not accessible by the general investing public.” See
id. at 1047.
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addition to the “144A” safe harbor for venture transactions on the
over-the-counter markets.57
Also, a resale exchange for Reg. CF investment
crowdfunding transactions does not currently exist.
For
example, an investor holding less than $100 can buy publicly
offered 1933 Act securities and then trade publicly traded stock
freely on their own or through a registered broker/dealer.58
Securities can also be bought under Reg. CF, but resale is not
readily available. To solve the resale and liquidity problems,
lawmakers have presented two promising bills that passed the
U.S. House of Representatives. The first bill is the Main Street
Growth Act.59
The Main Street Growth Act amends the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to allow for the registration of
venture exchanges with the SEC to provide a venue that is
tailored to the needs of small and emerging companies and offers
qualifying companies one venue in which their securities can
trade.60 The second bill is the Crowdfunding Amendments Act.
This bill would allow crowdfunding investors to pool their money
together into a fund that is advised by a registered investment
advisor.61
In 1933 Act offerings, traditional offerings have included
common stock, preferred stock, and debt instruments. However,
in Reg. CF offerings, securities offerings can include standard
equity, debt, revenue participations, and a variety of investment

57

See id. at 1055–57 (noting curiosity surrounding why “the SEC has not
already acted to create a domestic venture exchange”).
58
For members of the public, stocks on NYSE and NASDAQ can be purchased
at small dollar amounts with brokerage fees as low as $5.95. Online Broker Partners,
NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/online-brokers/ (last visited Feb. 17,
2019); see also NYSE Exchange Fees, INTERACTIVE BROKERS, https://www.inter
activebrokers.com/en/index.php?f=934 (last visited Feb. 17, 2019); Pricing, TD
AMERITRADE, https://www.tdameritrade.com/pricing.page (last visited Feb. 17, 2019)
(stock trades at $6.95 over the internet).
59
Main Street Growth Act is sponsored by Rep. Tom Emmer (R-MN). Main
Street Growth Act, H.R. 5877, 115th Congress (2017-2018). H.R. 5877 was
introduced on May 18, 2018 and passed the House on July 10, 2018. Id. On July 11,
2018, the bill was received in the Senate and read twice and referred to the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Id. It would allow for the
registration of venture exchanges with the SEC to provide a venue that is tailored to
the needs of small and emerging companies and offers qualifying companies one
venue in which their securities can trade. Id.
60
Id.
61
Crowdfunding Amendments Act, H.R. 6380, 115th Congress (2017-2018).
H.R. 6380 was introduced in the House on July 16, 2018 and referred to the House
Committee on Financial Services on July 16, 2018. Id.
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contracts,62 that funding portals have developed and promoted for
a company’s use.63 Companies have begun to offer more complex
investment contracts, such as SAFE—simple agreements for
future equity, KISS—keep it simple securities, and contractual
revenue sharing agreements.64
The SAFEs are not debt
instruments, but rather future equity instruments, whereby
shareholders have no voting or shareholder rights, and no lender
rights or priorities.65 A KISS, on the other hand, is a debt
instrument that offers convertible securities (equity or debt) with
favorable terms, like significant investor rights, protections, and
preferences upon conversion into equity.66 The research findings
demonstrate the continuation of SAFE investment contract
security offerings.67
Under Reg. CF, there has been a growth in the number of
investment contracts known as the simple agreement for future
token (“SAFT”)—an investment contract between a purchaser
and seller that promises the delivery of digital tokens or other
equity/debt instruments in the future,68 conditionally or
unconditionally.69 SAFT and its corollary future digital tokens
expanded in Reg. CF offerings between November of 2017
62

Wroldsen, supra note 6, at 589. Wroldsen identified two new forms of
simplified contracts, "SAFE" and “KISS," securities, specially tailored for
crowdfunding investment offerings with high-growth potential. These securities hold
great promise, though not without drawbacks. Wroldsen developed an
understanding of the taxonomy, terms, and variations in crowdfunding investment
contracts, illustrating a baseline, standardized investment contract, as well as the
emerging SAFE and KISS. Id. See also Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle,
Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe Safe, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 170–75
(2016).
63
Wroldsen, supra note 6, at 546.
64
Id. at 582; see also Giorgia Coltella, SAFE vs. KISS, The Evolution of the
Convertible Note, MEDIUM (Sept. 19, 2017), https://medium.com/centrally/safe-vskiss-the-evolution-of-the-convertible-note-4859d42a867d.
65
Wroldsen, supra note 6, at 573.
66
Id. at 570–71.
67
As of June 2018, outside of common stock transactions, SAFEs were the
number one type of security offered by two of the top five largest funding portals.
68
Pete Martin, What the Cardozo Report Gets Right and Wrong About SAFT’s
Approach to ICO Self-regulation, MEDIUM (Dec. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/votem/
what-the-cardozo-report-gets-right-and-wrong-about-safts-approach-to-ico-selfregulation-3bf7fbcc7be5 (citing NOT SO FAST—RISKS RELATED TO THE USE OF A
“SAFT” FOR TOKEN SALES (Cardozo Blockchain Project Research Reprt #1 Nov. 21,
2017)). See also Averie Brookes, U.S. Regulation of Blockchain Currencies: A Policy
Overview, 9 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 75, 102 (2018) (noting a company’s use of a
SAFT to launch its token sale and later development of a working model for selfregulation).
69
See infra Part I.C.
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through June 30, 2018.70 “The distinctive feature of SAFT is that
it splits the promise of future tokens from the distribution of
operational tokens.”71
In 2016, Joseph Green evaluated investment contracts
offered under Reg. CF and found that SAFEs were not so “safe”
or appropriate investments, as many of the companies would not
actually be able to raise venture capital funding.72 At this time,
the typical SAFE was a security developed by a Silicon Valley
company accelerator named Y Combinator for companies
expecting to raise institutional venture capital funding at a later
date.73 Time will tell whether they will be suitable investments
for investors. Reg. CF offerings are occurring within a broader
context of advancements in distributed ledger technology,74 which
present new opportunities and challenges for companies in their
quest to raise capital, and offer complexity for the investing
public and regulators.75
Reg. CF offerings and 1933 Act offerings are similar in that
both have notice requirements and companies are subject to
liability under Reg. CF investment crowdfunding. Securities
may be sold to any member of the public in small amounts, but
with a smaller cap of $1.07 million for Reg. CF companies,
compared to offerings in other safe harbor exemptions. Second,
neither purchase requires that the investor be sophisticated or
accredited like other exempt filings require. Third, investors can
lose their money from buying shares and other investment
70

See infra Part I.C.
See WERBACH, supra note 18, at 207 (noting that the initial transaction is
typically handled under SEC Regulation D or Regulation Crowdfunding, two of the
exceptions to the registration requirements for securities offerings).
72
See Green & Coyle, supra note 62, at 170, 174 (warning that “the
nomenclature ‘SAFE’ may actually be somewhat misleading” and that “[t]he safety
implied by the clever acronym ‘SAFE’ actually points to the instrument’s safety for
the issuing company—which is able to avoid the maturity dates associated with
convertible notes—rather than any safety for the investor.”).
73
See id. at 171.
74
The technological phase relates to the new cryptocurrency heights that have
recently been accomplished. First, there has been success in raising small dollar
amounts via Reg. CF to serve as a first step before a second round of funding.
Second, there have been successful ICOs, Reg. D and Reg A+ are raising significant
dollars in cryptocurrency, despite recent legal travails, fraud, and hacking. Third,
the development of blockchain and complimentary exchanges tie in to the future
trading of Reg. CF tokens.
75
See Wroldsen, supra note 6, at 551 (discussing inherent risks of crowdfunding
investments, including inherent uncertainty and high likelihood of failure of earlystage startup companies; sophistication of ordinary investors; and fraud running
rampant).
71
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instruments from a company registered under the 1933 Act,
possibly as easily as they might under Reg. CF. This means that
for both 1933 Act publicly offered securities and investment
crowdfunding: (1) securities are available publicly; (2) investors
need not be sophisticated or accredited investors before purchase;
and, (3) investors can risk the loss of their investment. Both
offerings must be mindful not to violate § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act.76
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to “use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.”77 Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful “to
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading,” as well as to engage in other manipulative and
deceptive activities.78
b.

Exempt Offerings

From the perspectives of both companies and investors,
complying with securities laws is wrought with complexity. For a
company, after the entity has decided to raise capital, it must
determine whether it wants to issue common or preferred stock,
debt, or possibly an investment contract. Once that decision is
made, there is a need to determine which exemption is best to
proceed with if they do want to sell a security. Not discussed in
this Article is the possibility of filing an intrastate security
offering.
Many states have passed their own state-level
crowdfunding exemptions, which exempt small business
intrastate crowdfunding from federal securities registration.79 As

76

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
Id. In Morris v. Overstock.com, the company was sued under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations or omissions made to shareholders on their
intent to engage in an ICO. Class Action Complaint for Violations of Federal
Securities Laws at 2–3, Morris v. Overstock.com, (D. Utah Mar. 29, 2018) (No.2:18cv-00271-PMW).
78
17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5(b) (2019).
79
Evan Glustrom, Note, Intrastate Crowdfunding in Alaska: Is There Security
In Following The Crowd?, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 293, 308 (2017) (“[t]hese state-level
regulations completely exempt intrastate crowdfunding from SEC regulation so long
as the issuer is organized in the state and all investors reside in the state”).
77
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of 2016, the majority of intrastate crowdfunding provisions
required a notice filing with a state regulator.80 However, there
are unrealistic limitations of selling only to in-state investors.
While there may be a variety of exemptions available, there may
be only one viable choice.
There are many differences between Reg. CF offerings and
other exempt filings.81 For example, Reg. D offerings under the
1933 Act allow two exemptions from § 5 registration
requirements under Rules 50482 and 506.83 These offerings are
considered private and have different restrictions than a public
offering. Reg. D offerings, which can only be made to accredited
sophisticated investors, can be resold under Rules 144 and 144A
with volume restrictions.84 But, resale restrictions continue for
non-accredited investors.85
There are additional restrictions and limitations on Reg. D
safe harbor exemptions. In Rule 504 offerings, issuers are
limited to offering up to $5 million in securities in a twelvemonth period, provided that the offerings are consistent with the
public interest, and certain bad actors are disqualified from
participation.86
Rule 504 currently permits the resale of securities issued in
Rule 504 offerings that involve general solicitation or
advertising where either the offering is registered in one or
more states and one or more states require the dissemination of
a state-approved disclosure document or the offering is exempt
but sales are only made to accredited investors.87
80
See Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 33-10238 (Oct. 26, 2016). E.g., Alabama, Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming and
the District of Columbia. Other states have pending legislation that would require
notice filings for intrastate crowdfunded offerings, e.g., California, Hawaii, Missouri,
Nevada, and New Hampshire.
81
The Commission amended Rule 504, effective January 20, 2017. Id. at 76–82.
It also repealed Rule 50, effective May 22, 2017. Id. at 82–86. Finally, the
Commission adopted new rule 147A as a safe harbor to the Section 3(a)(11)
exemption, effective April 20, 2017. Id. at 16.
82
17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a) (2018).
83
Id. § 230.506(a).
84
See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1026–27.
85
Id. at 1025.
86
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 75.
87
Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 33-10238 (Oct. 26, 2016).
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“Rule 506(b) prohibits general solicitation and limits sales to
no more than 35 non-accredited investors” whereas Rule 506(c)
allows general solicitation to an unlimited number of accredited
investors.88 Under 506(c), companies may sell to an unlimited
number of accredited investors, but cannot solicit investors.89 In
the next Section, some additional background is provided about
the emergence of crowdfunding and other available exemptions
and safe harbors operative during the new investment
crowdfunding era.
Outside of the costs and limitations trading, theoretically,
there is no reason that Reg. CF offerings could not succeed
and serve as an extremely positive force. Positive outcomes
include the democratization of company offerings,90 lower
crowdfunding transaction costs,91 increasing shareholder choice,
and funding portal inclusivity and efficiency.92 However, a flood
of speculative, risky, and uncertain securities may hinder
positive outcomes. The worst case is that the macro benefits
of this particular safe harbor are hijacked. Hijacking may be
a strong term to use, but it may be appropriate to the extent
that a flood of largely unregulated and potentially volatile
securities,93 securities fraud risk,94 or unfettered exuberance may
88
Id. at 86; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (“Each purchaser who is not an
accredited investor either alone or with his purchaser representative(s) has such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment . . . .”).
89
See Preston, supra note 50, at 326.
90
See Pekmezovic & Walker, supra note 35, at 347 (arguing that equity
crowdfunding “enhances access to capital for SMEs globally while simultaneously
democratizing access to investments for ordinary citizens”); see also Oranburg, supra
note 4, at 1029–31 (discussing the JOBS Act’s potential to achieve purported goals of
democratizing access to capital, creating jobs, and growing the innovation economy).
91
See Lee, supra note 7, at 68–69 and accompanying text.
92
See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 912 (theorizing that securities crowdfunding
campaigns have a tension between inclusiveness and efficiency: “[t]he SEC
concluded, again, probably correctly, that some level of exclusivity is needed for
crowdfunding to work; total inclusivity is simply too inefficient to function”).
93
Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes
to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 35 (2017) (advocating four
approaches regarding how to properly regulate FinTech, which include: “doing
nothing,” “cautious permissiveness through flexibility and forbearance,” “restricted
experimentation,” “and regulatory development”).
94
In the midst of the SEC’s adoption of Reg. CF, scholars wrote about investor
protection, securities fraud, and finding ways to balance what was perceived as an
opening for widespread theft of investors’ contributions. See Darian M. Ibrahim,
Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 606–07 (2015);
Dibadj, supra note 6, at 31, 39–44; Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan
Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78
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thwart the goals of the Crowdfund Act and hinder them from
being realized.
3.

Reg. CF Offerings and the Sale of Digital Tokens

The issuance of digital tokens reliant on blockchain
technology is an explosive development in capital fundraising
campaigns.95 Most of this activity is happening in the IPO
markets, but some of the activity is occurring in Reg. CF
offerings. This development has skeptics and proponents. On
the one hand, billionaire investor Warren Buffett says “ ‘[s]tay
away from it. It’s a mirage.’ ”96 Meanwhile, former U.S. CFTC
Chairman,
Gary
Gensler,
states
that
“blockchain
technology . . . underlying bitcoin has a real chance to be a
catalyst for change in the world of finance, and that’s because it
moves data and it also applies [] computer code across a
decentralized network.”97
To understand these assets and securities, the terms tokens,
crypto tokens, cryptocurrency, and blockchain ledger technology
are briefly described below. The definition of the word token has
recently been revised to: “a piece resembling a coin issued for
use . . . by a particular group on specified terms,” “issued as
money by some person or body other than a de jure government,”
or “a unit of cryptocurrency.”98 Historically, the word token
represented a tangible item, such as a bus token or a game token.
Practitioners and scholars classify tokens as “digital tokens,”
with a unit of value tied to a blockchain ledger.99 The token’s
TENN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011); Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration
Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1439–40 (2012).
95
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 463.
96
Mitch Tuchman, Heed Warren Buffett’s Warning: Bitcoin is Pure FOMO,
MARKETWATCH (February 10, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heedwarren-buffetts-warning-bitcoin-is-pure-fomo-2017-12-26 (“ ‘[t]he idea that it has
some huge intrinsic value is just a joke, in my view’ ”).
97
Dave Liedtka, Most Tokens From ICOs Are Securities, Former CFTC Head
Says, BLOOMBERG (October 15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-10-15/most-tokens-from-icos-are-securities-former-cftc-head-says.
98
Token, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
token (last visited Feb. 18, 2019). Cryptocurrency is defined as “any form of currency
that only exists digitally, that usually has no central issuing or regulating authority
but instead uses a decentralized system to record transactions and manage the
issuance of new units, and that relies on cryptography to prevent counterfeiting and
fraudulent transactions.” Cryptocurrency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/cryptocurrency (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
99
Baris & Klayman, supra note 18, at 70 (describing digital tokens as
representing a unit of value, which may make them look more like commodities,
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“virtual” or “digitized” characteristic evokes the colloquial term
“crypto token,” a term used by the tech industry to describe
virtual currencies or digital assets tied to the blockchain,100 and
recently by courts and the SEC as “cryptocurrency ‘tokens’ or
‘coins.’ ”101 Digital tokens can be a reward, combining functional
and consumptive elements, and also can be fundamental to a
blockchain network.102 Tokens can be purchased either with cash
or by using other coins.103 Tokens are also potentially tradeable
and transferable through an exchange for another coin or an item
of value.104 Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has
ruled that digital tokens will be treated as property for federal
income tax purposes.105
The SEC mandates that funding portals host a company’s
offering to investors. To visualize the role of the funding portal,
using Werbach’s square surrounded by six circles is helpful. An
intermediary is a central player in the offering and provides a
role between the company and the investor, as follows:
Graphic of an Intermediary’s Role106

stating: “There is tremendous flexibility in how to structure digital tokens and what
those digital tokens may represent.”). Nathan Dudgeon & Gareth Malna, Distributed
Ledger Technology: From Blockchain to ICOs, 37 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y
REP. 4, 4 (February 2018) (“A blockchain facilitates online transactions by acting as
a secure, digitized, decentralized, public ledger.”).
100
Michael Patterson, Crypto’s 80% Plunge is Now Worse Than the Dot-Com
Crash, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201809-12/crypto-s-crash-just-surpassed-dot-com-levels-as-losses-reach-80.
101
United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 (RJD), 2018 WL 4346339, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. 2018).
102
Baris & Klayman, supra note 18, at 75 n.47.
103
See Zaslavskiy, 2018 WL 4346339, at *5 (noting the type of currency, such as
Bitcoin or ether, that can purchase an app token); see also infra Part I.C.
104
See infra Part I.C.
105
I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, I.R.B. 2014-16 (Apr. 14, 2014).
106
See WERBACH, supra note 18, at 25–27.Werbach describes an “intermediary”
as one connoted by the box as a “trust architecture,” with the intermediary taking
“the place of social norms and government-issued laws to structure transactions.” Id.
at 27.
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Examples of large enterprises utilizing intermediary models
are Amazon, eBay, Uber, and Airbnb, where the consumer goes
to their respective platform selling the items of a third party
business.107 This intermediary model for funding portals was
adopted by the SEC, but it may provide a false sense of security
for investors. The funding portal has limited liability and the
funding portal isn’t designing the disclosure language included in
the offering by the companies. What is more ironic about
centralizing the intermediary funding portal function, is that for
digital tokens, what is offered would be a different type of
securities model because the security is reliant on the
development of the blockchain network.
Werbach illustrates how a blockchain network operates,
which he describes as one where “nothing is assumed to be
trustworthy . . . except the output of the network itself . . . . [and]
defines th[is] landscape for the blockchain’s interactions with
law, regulation, and governance.”108
It may be a minor point, but it is unclear what the real value
of the funding portals is, outside of centralizing an activity that
will inevitably become decentralized.
Why would a company use these blockchain-based digital
tokens? This method allows a business to create its own digital
assets for sale to the public—similar to an initial public
offering.109 These digital tokens are developed to reside on an
issuing company’s own blockchain and can represent an asset or
a utility,110 a right to services and other goods, as well as a
variety of other uses.111 Some companies are offering digital
tokens because they seek to become a dominant competitive
player in this developing innovation. Furthermore, blockchain107

Id. at 28.
See id. at 29.
109
See Dudgeon & Malna, supra note 99, at 6 (providing a definition and an
explanation why ICOs are so popular globally).
110
See infra Part I.C.
111
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21. The authors provide distinctions between
different types of tokens reliant on blockchain technology: e.g., utility tokens, “which
have both consumptive and speculative characteristics;” protocol tokens, which are
tokens used “to compensate parties for participation in some activity that
contributes to the maintenance of the blockchain and its network” e.g., a token to the
person(s) that validate cryptographic hash for a block; and app tokens which are
“created by deploying a smart contract program on the Ethereum network[.]” Id. at
468, 470, 474.
108
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based token offerings sold to Reg. CF investors are occasionally a
testing ground for future ICOs.112
4.

Digital Token Regulatory Controversy

Scholars argue that there are three categories of regulatory
controversy: illegality, validity, and classification regarding the
broader category called “cryptocurrency.”113
There are
overlapping jurisdictions among federal regulators regarding the
regulation of digital tokens, from the CFTC, the SEC, the
Treasury Department, the Department of Justice, and the IRS.114
One court has stated that the CFTC has concurrent jurisdiction
with the SEC over the future of digital currencies.115 Recently,
the SEC found that cryptocurrencies issued for the purpose of
raising funds are securities and thus subject to securities laws.116
The SEC has also set up a new Cyber Unit which is issuing alerts
for investors of coin offerings.117 The IRS continues with its
112
Michael R. Meadows, Note, The Evolution of Crowdfunding: Reconciling
Regulation Crowdfunding with Initial Coin Offerings, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
272, 273 (2018) (Meadows’ article focused principally on ICOs as a method of
crowdfunding, noting that “[w]hile ICOs serve as an effective method of raising
capital, crypto-crowdfunding may repackage traditional crowdfunding models that
would otherwise trigger federal securities laws.”). In their own right, ICOs are a
crowdfunding method used by companies to raise capital selling digital assets (e.g.
digital token) that utilize blockchain technology.
113
WERBACH, supra note 18, at 178.
114
Jai R. Massari et al., The Fragmented Regulatory Landscape for Digital
Tokens, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/26/the-fragmented-regulatory-landscapefor-digital-tokens/; see also Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. McDonnell,
287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (entering a Preliminary Injunction Order
against Defendants Patrick K. McDonnell and CabbageTech, Corp. d/b/a Coin Drop
Markets and affirming the CFTC’s January 18, 2018 complaint charging defendants
with fraud and misappropriation in connection with purchases and trading of the
virtual currencies Bitcoin and LiteCoin).
115
McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 230 (affirming that CFTC has standing to
exercise its enforcement power over fraud related to virtual currencies sold in
interstate commerce and granting a preliminary injunction in favor of the CFTC).
116
Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund:
Operational Issues and Best Practices for an Emergent Investment Industry, 23
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 112, 116 n.10 (2018); see also Report of Investigation
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO,
Exchange Act Release No. 81027 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter DAO Report].
117
Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives
to Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail Investors (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-176. See also Investor Alert: Public
Companies Making ICO-Related Claims, INVESTOR.GOV (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investoralert-public-companies-making-ico-related (last visited on Feb. 18, 2019). The SEC's
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exclusive jurisdiction over taxation of tokens, and to the extent
that a crime has been committed, the Department of Justice may
intervene. Thus, to better understand the legality of the various
jurisdictional questions, companies need to be counseled wisely
about various agency considerations.
With respect to classification, the current regulatory
framework for digital tokens and cryptocurrencies has been
described as a “fragmented, overlapping, and complex regulatory
landscape,”118 including its treatment as property for federal
income tax purposes.119 Some argue that the use of SAFTs for
the purchase of “pre-functional” tokens delivers a “functional”
token that ultimately is not a security.120 Others argue the use of
a SAFT likely muddies the analysis of whether a utility token is
a security for purposes of U.S. federal securities law.121
According to a recent SEC report pursuant to Section 21(a),
the SEC applied longstanding securities law principles to
demonstrate that a token constituted an investment contract,
and therefore, was a security under U.S. federal securities
laws.122 The SEC concluded that this DAO digital token offering
represented an investment of money in a common enterprise
with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.123 It also noted
that “merely calling a token a utility token or structuring it to
provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a
security.”124 Applying the Howey test,125 the SEC’s arguments
Office of Investor Education and Advocacy issued an Investor Alert in August 2017
warning investors about scams of companies claiming to be engaging in ICOs.
118
Massari et al., supra note 114; see also Meadows, supra note 112, at 272–73.
Meadows’ article focuses principally on ICOs as a method of crowdfunding. However,
Meadows notes the “unique issues crypto-crowdfunding poses to participating
consumers and regulatory authorities” as well as issues “with the emergence of
blockchain technology, which adds an additional layer of complexity in determining
whether federal securities laws apply to a crowdfunding campaign.” Id. at 273.
119
I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, I.R.B. 2014-16 (Apr. 14, 2014).
120
Baris & Klayman, supra note 18, at 76.
121
Id. at 76.
122
DAO Report, supra note 116, at 15. See also Preston, supra note 50, at 322
(stating that the Howey test can be refined to four factors to consider an investment
contract a security: (1) “[i]t is an investment of money; (2) [t]he investment of money
is in a common enterprise; (3) [a]ny profit comes from the efforts of a promotor or
third party; and (4) [t]here is an expectation of profits from the investment.”).
123
DAO Report, supra note 116, at 15.
124
Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Jay Clayton, Statement on
Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11.
125
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
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would seemingly apply to tokens and other offerings would be
securities. These tokens incorporate features and marketing
efforts that emphasize the potential for profits based on the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others which
arehallmarks of a security under U.S. law.126
However, while companies issue digital tokens under the
applicable safe harbors, the SEC’s ability to regulate in this
market is not settled. Former SEC Chair Mary Jo White
distinguished virtual currencies as not necessarily being
securities; she also stated that interest and returns could be
subject to securities regulation. Well-publicized ICO offerings
make up a much greater portion of ICOs than do Reg. CF digital
tokens.127 That being said, ICOs are being closely monitored by
the SEC, the CFTC, and the FTC.128 Reg. CF blockchain-based
offerings on the other hand, are not monitored in the same way
because companies file the required and periodic notices with the
SEC, including disclosure documents that include the predictions
of risk affiliated with the offerings.
The method by which digital tokens are offered and sold to
investors varies in that the offerings “can take many different
forms, and the rights and interests a coin is purported to provide
the holder can vary.”129
Digital tokens can be offered to
purchasers outside of the United States under Reg. S as long as
the tokens do not flow back to the United States.130 The digital
tokens can be registered, offered, and sold to shareholders under
Rule 144131 of the 1933 Act or under a safe harbor exemption (e.g.
Reg. A, Reg. A+, Reg. D), as long as the company complies with
the requirements of these alternatives.

126

Press Release, Statement on Cryptocurrencies, supra note 124 (“On this and
other points where the application of expertise and judgment is expected, I believe
that gatekeepers and others, including securities lawyers, accountants and
consultants, need to focus on their responsibilities. I urge you to be guided by the
principal motivation for our registration, offering process and disclosure
requirements: investor protection and, in particular, the protection of our Main
Street investors.”).
127
See infra Part I.C.
128
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 465 (noting that “the Securities
Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) and its counterparts in other jurisdictions have
turned their attention to token sales”).
129
Press Release, Statement on Cryptocurrencies, supra note 124.
130
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 508 n.226 (referencing Reg. S,
17 C.F.R. § 230.904 for offshore filings).
131
17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2018).
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Since Reg. CF’s inception, over 1,100 companies have offered
over $600 million of securities to investors under Reg. CF.132
These amounts represent a sizable expansion in investment
crowdfunding under these agency rules and rebuts the notion
that few would use the exemption.133 A part of that growth is
attributed to the surprising development of Reg. CF “digital
token” or “blockchain-based token” offerings, which represent a
newer type of investment contract, distinguishable and
seemingly more complex than prior investment contracts offered
under Reg. CF. These type of token offerings are proliferating
and being sold to investors, growing at a greater pace than
traditional investment crowdfunding securities offerings. If
growth continues at this pace, these Reg. CF digital tokens will
expand the type and quality of securities historically offered to
investors.
Digital tokens are being offered and sold through both
investment contracts under Reg. CF134 and through registered
ICOs.135 ICOs represent a significant number of the tokens sold
outside of Reg. CF digital tokens. However, digital tokens are
also being offered and sold without registration, a method subject
to enhanced scrutiny by the SEC and other state securities
enforcement agencies.136
132

Details about the companies and total amounts raised in investment
crowdfunding campaigns are discussed infra Part I.C. The total offerings do not
include any amounts offered or raised in ICOs nor any amounts raised under other
available securities exemptions, such as Reg. A+ or Reg. D. Also, this figure does not
represent success or failure in amounts actually raised under the campaign.
133
Of the 1,112 filings, several duplications were removed from the data.
134
See infra Part I.C.
135
Not to be confused with registered ICOs, digital tokens offered under Reg. CF
are offered and sold in transactions exempt from federal securities laws governing
the registration of securities offerings. There are a variety of securities laws that
still apply to Reg. CF filings, including disclosures about the companies, insider
trading, and limitations on the transactions allowed (e.g., amount offered by the
issuer is under $1.07 million in any twelve-month period and small dollar amounts
sold to investors). Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 5. This Article seeks to
address the scope and effect of token offering campaigns on companies and their
investors and to provide recommendations as to how regulators may want to rethink
Reg. CF investment crowdfunding in light of developments in Reg. CF token
offerings.
136
Brian Fung, State Regulators Unveil Nationwide Crackdown On Suspicious
Cryptocurrency Investment Schemes, WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/21/state-regulators-unveil-nationwidecrackdown-on-suspicious-cryptocurrency-investment-schemes/?utm_term=.e342
d426441b (“Securities regulators across the United States and Canada announced
dozens of investigations . . . into potentially deceitful cryptocurrency investment
products, the largest coordinated crackdown to date by state and provincial officials
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Digital tokens are a more recent development in capital
formation.137 These offerings present yet another difference
between crowdfunding and 1933 Act registered offerings. On the
one hand, these digital token offerings are a novel and innovative
solution for company capital formation that appears to be
intriguing the public.
In the short term, companies are
beginning to raise money to grow their businessess, advance the
business’ mission, and satisfy the crowd’s healthy appetite to
invest. In that respect, investment crowdfunding via Reg. CF
shows promising signs of being an innovative bridge towards the
goal of capital formation. However, if issuing a token was as
simple as providing a consumer good to an interested buyer, the
story would be over. The coins might be located next to a comic
book or beanie baby collection and noone would care. However,
there is a variety to the characteristics of digital tokens. A
digital token could be used as a functional utility used to
consume a product or service, as an investment security with
possible growth potential, or as a commodity like gold or silver.138
It is important to note a few distinctions in ICO digital
tokens and Reg. CF blockchain-based tokens. To put the two in
perspective, one should first understand the varying volumes of
the offering activity over the past few years. First, Rohr and
Wright reported that in 2016 less than $100 million in ICO
digital tokens were sold, but by October 2017, that number grew
to over $3.7 billion.139 Current estimates show that by March
2018, ICO digital tokens had continued to grow rapidly to $11.3
billion, with a single $1.7 billion transaction by a company
named Telegram.140 However, the top 100 cryptocurrencies sold
on Bitcoin scams . . . . The state agencies are also pursuing suspicious cases of initial
coin offerings, or ICOs, a fundraising technique used by both legitimate and
illegitimate cryptocurrency projects in ways that resemble initial public offerings of
stock.”).
137
See infra Part I.C; see also Knyazeva, supra note 42 (regarding Reg. A
financing, Knyazeva states that as of October 31, 2016, prospective issuers had
publicly filed offering statements for 147 Reg. A+ offerings, for $2.6 billion in
financing). Of the exempt filings, Reg. D offerings for 2016 had 23,292 offerings
totaling over $2 trillion dollars. See Jonathan Nieh, Update on Regulation D: Data
from 2016 Form D’s, CROWDFUND INSIDER (April 19, 2017), https://www.crowdfund
insider.com/2017/04/97876-update-regulation-d-data-2016-form-ds/.
138
See infra Part I.C.
139
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 465.
140
David Floyd, $6.3 Billion: 2018 ICO Funding Has Passed 2017's Total,
COINDESK (April 19, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/6-3-billion-2018-ico-fundingalready-outpaced-2017/ (noting that in just the first quarter of 2018, $6.3 billion of
ICO digital tokens were raised, representing 118% of the 2017 total of $5 billion).
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globally have a market capitalization of over $208 billion, with
Bitcoin having a market capitalization of $112.7 billion in
September 2018,141 which dropped to $58 billion by December 6,
2018.142
Growing rapidly, but at a lesser magnitude than ICO digital
tokens, are Reg. CF digital tokens, which didn’t begin selling at
all until the fall of 2017.143 The offerings then grew to $22
million between November 2017 and June 30, 2018.144 Relatively
speaking, there is no real comparison with the global explosion
that has taken place between ICO digital tokens and Reg. CF
digital tokens. Reg. CF digital tokens are a small, but growing
part of the token expansion. However, what distinguishes these
offerings is that the Reg. CF investors are members of the public,
not necessarily sophisticated investors.
To determine whether digital tokens offered under Reg. CF
are investment contracts and thus, potentially securities, one
would look to the Howey standard.145 Under the Howey standard,
whether there is an “investment contract” under the Securities
Act depends on “whether the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from
the efforts of others.” In addition, the Court in Howey further
clarified, “[i]f that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the
enterprise is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a
sale of property with or without intrinsic value.”146
Multiple federal and state agencies are pondering just how
digital tokens should be classified and the extent to which
agencies should regulate them. Historically, the 1933 Act has
created private rights of action to aid the enforcement of
obligations pertaining to securities offerings.147 Towards that
141
COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited on Feb. 20, 2019).
But cf., Kyle Torpey, Comparing Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrencies by ‘Market Cap’
Can Be Very Misleading, FORBES (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
ktorpey/2017/12/29/comparing-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies-by-market-capcan-be-very-misleading/#62cbdb832509 (“Many cryptocurrency traders track the
price of these digital assets on sites like CoinMarketCap.com, but the key metric
that is most often used to compare these cryptocurrencies, market cap, can
sometimes be misleading.”).
142
See Bitcoin, YAHOO FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/BTC-USD?p=
BTC-USD (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
143
See infra Part I.C.
144
See infra Part I.C.
145
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
146
Id.
147
See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Employees Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066
(2018).
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end, the SEC has recently appointed Valerie A. Szczepanik to the
SEC Division of Corporation Finance to oversee the securities
laws and digital asset technologies.148
Additionally, “[t]he
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . which regulates not the
original issuance of securities but all their subsequent trading, is
[] enforceable through private rights of action.”149 The SEC is
currently monitoring digital tokens as possible securities within
the larger category of virtual currencies.150
“Digital
tokens . . . can represent units of value, which may make them
look more like commodities[.]”151
Digital tokens have been distinguished from currency. In
contrast, digital tokens as digital currency “do[] not have any
legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”152 Bitcoin exemplifies
this currency distinction: it is not considered a currency in the
United States since it lacks the recognition by any state.153
Brian Quintenz of the CFTC has spoken on the complexity of
the classification of tokens:
However, just because a product is tokenized does not change
its underlying qualities. For example, if Disney World were to
tokenize the admissions to its theme parks, those tokens would
still be tickets. Tokenizing the tickets does not make them

148
See Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names Valerie A.
Sczcepanik Senior Advisor for Digital Assets and Innovation (June 4, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-102. Szczepanik’s new role is to
“coordinate efforts across all SEC Divisions and Offices regarding the application of
U.S. securities laws to emerging digital asset technologies and innovations,
including Initial Coin Offerings and cryptocurrencies.” Id.
149
Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1062. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a law
governing the secondary trading of securities (stocks, bonds, and debentures) in the
United States. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2012).
150
See Mokhtarian & Lindgren, supra note 116, at 116 n.10
151
See Baris & Klayman, supra note 18, at 70. The Internal Revenue Service
defines currency as “the coin and paper money of the United States or any other
country that [i] is designated as legal tender and that [ii] circulates and [iii] is
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of issuance.”
IRS NOTICE 2014-21, SECTION 2, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf (last visited April 9, 2019).
152
Dep’t of Treasury, FIN-2013-G001 (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.fincen.gov/
sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.
153
Gregory M. Karch, Bitcoin, the Law and Emerging Public Policy: Towards a
21st Century Regulatory Scheme, 10 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 193, 231 (2014); see also
Lorena Yashira Gely-Rojas, Note, Cryptocurrencies and the Uniform Commercial
Code: The Curious Case of Bitcoin, 8 U. OF P. R. BUS. L. J.129, 132–34 (2017).
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currencies and it does not make them securities. It makes them
tickets.Similarly, tokenizing a security does not change the fact
that it is a security.154

Quintenz further explained why he thought there might be a
frenzy around digital tokens:
As I postulated two days ago at the City Week conference in
London, I see three main motivations for the broader
tokenization revolution. One motivation for a company or entity
to tokenize a product is purely as a marketing ploy—to take
advantage of the popular and speculative mania surrounding all
things “token.” . . . A second motivation to create a token is to
enable and realize the efficiency of the blockchain construct in
assigning and tracking ownership. This is having, and will
continue to have, an impact on title transfer and settlement
processes.
Think of this as the back office tokenization
revolution. Lastly, a third motivation is to utilize the
transferability of tokens to create a secondary market for any
and all non-tangible things—the eBay of Intangibles so to
speak—for rights, services, permissions, etc., that the seller
allows to be transferred between parties.155

Because violations of § 5 may result in rescission, cautious
companies proceed gingerly by filing under the Reg. CF
exemption.156 Commissioner Quintenz noted the transformative
nature of coins in ICO transactions, stating that “[t]hey may
start their life as a security from a capital-raising perspective but
then at some point . . . turn into a commodity.”157 The next
154

Brian Quintenz, Commissioner, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
Remarks at the Eurofi High Level Seminar (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz11.
155
Id. Commissioner Quintenz also complimented the secondary market
development: “Empowering a secondary market’s price discovery and valuation
functions for products that were previously untransferable—such as extra storage
space on a home computer—is a fascinating development.” Id.
156
Indeco, Offering Statement (Form C) (June 27, 2018). Indeco’s CEO explains
why his company had enough concerns to proceed and file with the Securities
Exchange Commission. He took the position that the token offering could be
considered something other than a “utility” and more likely a “security.” Id. See also
David Levine, Indeco Launces First Token Pre-Sale Under SEC’s Regulation
Crowdfunding Rules, MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2017), https://medium.com/indeco/indecolaunches-first-token-pre-sale-under-secs-regulation-crowdfunding-rulese82dad79345.
157
Lukas Schor, Explaining The “Simple Agreement for Future Tokens”
Framework, MEDIUM (Nov. 29, 2017), https://medium.com/@argongroup/explainingthe-simple-agreement-for-future-tokens-framework-15d5e7543323
(describing
Commissioner Quintenz’ statement as “probably the most specific comment by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission regarding the classification of ICO’s and
shows quite well the bipolar nature of many tokens”).
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Section discusses the rationale and methodology for this research
study and what can be learned from investment crowdfunding
data.
The growth of digital tokens in Reg. CF offerings raises three
troubling concerns. First, Reg. CF digital tokens are showing a
greater momentum than other Reg. CF offerings. As digital
tokens could have different characteristics, an investor would
need to review the particular description very closely. Consider
Rohr and Wright’s argument that tokens lack “homogeneity.”158
Query, what then are investors purchasing? Moreover, as digital
tokens are being sold to investors to finance unbuilt technological
funding portals and services for future ICO transactions, Reg. CF
investors are taking the greatest risks of loss.
These
unsophisticated and non-accredited investors are subject to a set
of different investor qualifications and resale restrictions than
purchasers ICO transactions, which are closely monitored by the
SEC. This is not the case with digital token offerings under Reg.
CF.
Second, the company disclosures contain the standard legend
and the risks of investing in these type of transactions:
A crowdfunding investment involves risk. An investor should
not invest any funds in this [o]ffering unless he or she can
afford to lose his or her entire investment. In making an
investment decision, investors must rely on their own
examination of the [i]ssuer and the terms of the [o]ffering,
including the merits and risks involved . . . The securities have
not been recommended or approved by any federal or state
securities commission or regulatory authority. Furthermore,
these authorities have not passed upon the accuracy or
adequacy of this document. The [SEC] does not pass upon the
merits of any [s]ecurities offered or the terms of the [o]ffering,
nor does it pass upon the accuracy or completeness of any
offering document or literature . . . These Securities are offered
under the 4(a)(6) Exemption; however, the SEC has not made
an independent determination that the [s]ecurities are exempt
from registration.159

158

See Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 463.
See Pokeology, Crowdfunding Offering Statement, NEXTSEED, at 14 (Nov.
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1720051/000172005117000001/doc
ument1.pdf.
159
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Other Reg. CF offerings go further, outlining some of the risks of
investing in blockchain-based tokens:
The chain code concept, the underlying software application and
software platform . . . is still in an early development stage and
unproven. There is no warranty or assurance that the process
for creating [] Tokens will be uninterrupted or error-free and
there is an inherent risk that the software could contain defects,
vulnerabilities, weaknesses, bugs or viruses causing the
complete loss of [] contributions and/or [] Tokens. Additionally,
there are other risks associated with the acquisition, storage,
transfer and use of [] Tokens, including those that . . . may not
be [anticipated].
Such risks may further materialize as
unanticipated variations or combinations of the risks.160

The research begs the question, why, after reading these
disclaimers, would anyone invest in digital token offerings? If
the blockchain token concept does not materialize, it is likely that
the companies seeking to use them will not have adequate
funding to repay the obligation and the investors may lose all or
a portion of their investment.
Third, the SEC needs to rethink how to advise
unsophisticated investors, who may not have an income to fall
back on if the investment fails, as do accredited investors.161 It is
uncertain whether the underlying premise for the offerings will
create a framework for “digital assets used in connection with
decentralized services, applications, and communities.”162 As
promising as these offerings may be, digital tokens are
fundamentally based on a theoretical idea.
While federal agencies and the courts sort out their
respective roles in regulating cryptocurrencies,163 there is a quiet
digital token revolution occurring within smaller Reg. CF
campaigns.
160
TrustaBit, Blockchain for Delayed Flights, at 24, https://trustabit.io/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/TrustaBit-final.pdf.
161
Another common disclaimer in offering memoranda of Reg. CF offerings is
“[a] crowdfunding investment involves risk. An investor should not invest any funds
in this Offering unless he or she can afford to lose his or her entire investment.” See
Pokeology, supra note 159, at 14.
162
Juan Batiz-Benet et al., The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale
Framework, PROTOCOL LABS, at 1 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFTProject-Whitepaper.pdf.
163
There are a variety of proposals regarding how each agency could consider
regulating, however that is not the subject this Article. The Author does take the
position that it is time for Congress to recognize that digital currencies are blooming
in the United States and globally. Congressional clarity on the digital currencies
would be useful.
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B. Digital Token Research and Summary of Findings
1.

Rationale and Methodology for Research Study

There is an ongoing need for federal and state agencies,
companies, and investors, to analyze available data to assess the
current state of capital formation and employment under this
new regulation. A better understanding of the offerings and
transactions that have transpired over the past several years
would provide a template for future successful offerings, better
investor protection, and better crafted regulatory policies aimed
at accomplishing the normative goals of the regulations. This
Section explains the methodology behind the research project.
This research study sought to determine if the impacts of
Reg. CF regulations have been worthy of lament or applause. To
determine those effects, we turn to researching the available
data. After undertaking a review of the prior SEC Edgar Data,
this Article provides information, findings, and analysis relating
to Reg. CF campaigns in the United States.164 Researchers for
this Article retrieved and reviewed 1,112 SEC Form C notice
filings and other SEC filings completed by companies from Reg.
CF’s adoption date through June 30, 2018.
From May 2016 through June 30, 2018, companies filed
1,112 Form C notice filings in Reg. CF transactions,165 offering
over $600 million of securities to investors. These Form C filings
provide critical data about the companies that seek to offer
equity, debt, and investment contracts, the funding portals that
provide the portal structure, and the transactions that are
offered to the crowd of potential investors.
A proactive monitoring of data can illustrate the growth,
success, and failures of companies. This would be valuable
information to help policy makers continue to accurately set state
and federal policy designed to enhance innovation nationwide as
well as protect investors.166 This research provides insights on
what has transpired since the adoption of Reg. CF. Further, this

164

See Form C., supra note 12.
Of the 1,112 Form C filings, several were excluded because of duplication, a
subsequent withdrawal of the filing, or a request filed as a Form C, but merely an
extension of the timeframes.
166
E.g., Parsont, supra note 24, at 341 (recommending that the SEC generate
empirical data and conduct a special study on capital-raising impediments and
investor protection).
165
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Article analyzes the crowdfunding marketplace and highlights
emerging developments and trends, along with insights on Reg.
CF’s impact on innovation.
The data included digitally filed responses to the following
questions:
1. Company Demographics: Describe the names, incorporation
location and principal office of companies registering
investment offerings under the Crowdfunding Act.167
2. Offering Details: Type of security; Target offering; Minimum
offering and maximum offering; Data to quantify the
amount of securities offered per period and over time.
3. Funding Portal Details: Description of the name of the
funding portal or self-funder for each offering and the
compensation terms.
4. Employee Details: The number of employees the company
disclosed on Form C.
5. Aggregate Amount: of capital sought by companies disclosed
on Form C.

There are limits to the data collection from the SEC Edgar
database. First, data on Edgar does not include unregistered
investment crowdfunding campaigns. Unregistered campaigns
could stem from other allowed securities transactions exempt
under other sections of the Securities laws, such as ICOs, IPOs,
or other Reg. D and 33 Act filings. Alternatively, the securities
may not register because the transaction is exempt under a statelevel intrastate crowdfunding exemption.
There could
conceivably be campaigns that companies are choosing not to
register anywhere for various ill-advised reasons. Also, several
foreign registrants with principal offices located in the United
States are not included in the choice of entity location data.
The research in this Article differs from earlier work in that
it was not seeking to assess the success or failure of any
particular offerings, the totality of the success of the offerings, or
to make a prediction about whether scholars could call this
crowdfunding investment era a success. Rather, the intention
was to frame what we can infer about the scope of investment
crowdfunding and to provide insights about the information

167
Additionally, for each company, the Central Index Key (“CIK”) was also
noted. The CIK is a unique, public number that is assigned to each entity that
submits filings to the SEC. Use of the CIK allows the SEC to differentiate between
filing entities with similar names.
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retrieved.168 To that end, evaluation of the data provides insights
on: (1) investment crowdfunding’s momentum; (2) the companies
that had sought capital from investors; (3) the intermediation of
the securities/transactions; and (4) geographical scope, choice of
entity and notable inferences about the type of securities that
were offered to investors. As mentioned before, since digital
tokens were noted, more detail was provided on these securities.
2.

Definition of Success

Accomplishing the normative goals of job creation, access to
capital, inclusion, and efficiency, would generally be thought of
as a success under Reg. CF. However, more research, over time,
is needed to determine whether the regulations have succeeded
in goal attainment. For purposes of this research project, this
Article defines success by three measures—company
engagement, the amount of capital actually raised, and the
investors successfully obtaining a positive return on their
investment. The level of company engagement in offering capital
under Reg. CF is important because if companies are not
utilizing this safe harbor exemption then it is obsolete and serves
no purpose. If they are turning to this form of investment
crowdfunding, then at least they are engaging.
Another
successful outcome would be for these companies to raise capital
and put that capital to use to create jobs and undertake their
operations.
If shareholders are not receptive to company
offerings, then again, the regulations are of no utility. Also, it is
as important that investors are successful, which is defined as
the likelihood of a positive return on investment.
In addition to the number of companies participating and the
level of the transactions, the number of funding portals would
provide insights about the developing story of investment
crowdfunding.
If many companies wanted to seek capital
through Reg. CF, but there were no funding portals to help them
accomplish the objective, we would be discussing the dreams and
hopes of what Reg. CF could be. However, funding portals
provide a separate story, as further discussed below.

168

Within scope, one might assess risks and rewards. However, the results of
many of the campaigns are still ongoing. Thus, assessing the risks and rewards
could be the subject of a future article.
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a.

Momentum in Investment Crowdfunding
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There is an overlap in the recent discussions about emerging
FinTech and its effect on legal theory and society. FinTechenabled transactions include tools of contracting and
commerce.169
Consequently, it is hard to imagine that
investment crowdfunding on internet funding portals would not
be considered within that definition or an expansion of that
definition. There is much to be learned about the funding portals
that are provided for the companies to raise money and their role
in educating investors about transactions.
By analyzing SEC Edgar data concerning the funding portals
that provide the internet funding portals for the securities, new
revelations and inferences are possible. The Form C filings
reveal which funding portal is hosting the offering and their
respective costs of doing the transactions. Also, the data
illustrates the level of a funding portal’s choice in the type of
transactions a funding portal may choose to support. Professor
Schwartz’s distinctions drawn between the United States and
New Zealand undergird the tension between efficiency versus
inclusion.170 The data hint at levels of influence that may
minimize inclusion in investment crowdfunding while enhancing
efficiencies for the funding portal. Further, the analysis also
provides data about the funding portal’s choice of company
transactions around the country.
Data is provided on the funding portals and their
intermediation. One trend noted is towards efficiency, as fewer
funding portals handle a greater portion of the transactions. At
the same time, as investment crowdfunding campaigns are
growing, there are also more funding portals responsible for
doing a few transactions.
The investment crowdfunding
geographic concentrations and dispersal are noted by Professor
Magnuson as a form of “diffusion” in the FinTech Markets.171
Magnuson argues that FinTech has “defied [the] conventional

169

Christopher G. Bradley, Fintech’s Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 77
(2018) (arguing that FinTech has a broad definition and is divided into three types,
especially in the consumer area: efficient information gathering and monitoring;
tools of contracting and commerce; and enforcement and dispute resolution tools).
170
See generally Schwartz, supra note 14, at 885–86.
171
William J. Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era, 23 STAN. J. L.
BUS. AND FIN. 159, 163.
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understanding” of concentration of financial markets.172 In
FinTech markets, the players have “smaller sections of the
market, focus on narrow industry areas, and often are made up of
a number of nimble start-ups . . . or even computer servers.”173
From the data collected, between 2017 and 2018, funding portals
have increasing concentrations of deals, while at the same time,
there are more funding portals that are hosting a greater number
of the campaigns. A future research project could evaluate the
role and impact of this level of funding portal concentration and
dispersion on business capital formation.
Reg. CF digital token offerings sold to investors are growing
at a greater pace than traditional investment crowdfunding
securities offerings. If the growth continues at this pace, these
Reg. CF digital tokens will expand the type and quality of
securities historically offered to investors. The Reg. CF digital
tokens are also disrupting the investment marketplace, as these
initial transactions are a leverage to other, future ICOs. This
development may provide both potentially positive and negative
disruptive qualities to the investment marketplace depending on
the success of blockchain technology.
Despite the market’s infancy, findings suggest that
investment crowdfunding has enjoyed sustained momentum.
There is greater breadth in the number of companies performing
these publicly offered crowdfunding campaigns. Campaigns can
be measured by the increasing numbers of company principal
office locations throughout the country, increasing amounts and
types of securities offerings, and increasing variety in the
companies that are participating. Since Reg. CF’s inception, over
1,100 companies have offered over $600 million of securities to
investors under Reg. CF. These amounts represent a sizable
expansion in investment crowdfunding under these regulations,
which rebuts the notion that few would use the exemption.
b.

Securities and Digital Token Risk

Investors have had the opportunity to invest in a variety of
companies’ securities offerings. Investors in Reg. CF offerings
need not be accredited, wealthy, or financially sophisticated,174 to
172

Id. at 168.
Id. at 166.
174
Informed Investor Advisory: Crowdfunding, N. AMERICAN SEC. ADMIN. ASS’N,
(July 24, 2018), http://www.nasaa.org/12842/informed-investor-advisory-crowdfund
ing/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
173
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participate in these transactions. Investors can invest amounts
ranging from $2,000 to $107,000 in a twelve-month period
depending on their income and net worth.175 Securities offerings
have ranged from traditional, common, and preferred stock
offerings, to less traditional options like convertible debt,
membership, and partnership units, investment contracts, and
digital tokens. The SEC considers crowdfunding investments as
exempt from registration, and the securities have resale
restrictions that raise liquidity issues.176
The type of securities that investors may buy from company
crowdfunding campaigns and the risks that may flow from these
agreements are important lines of legal research. Legal inquiry
into business transactions is different from business inquiry
regarding the transactions. In a business inquiry, one would
want to know whether the company has good fundamentals,177
whether it is a good business risk, and whether the market
conditions are right for this particular type of venture so that the
investor can receive a return on his or her investment. But
evaluating the text of securities and investment contracts in
order to determine legality and risk is the realm of securities
lawyers and tax professionals.
There is a level of uncertainty and risk with a company
offering digital tokens phrasing their offerings in the blockchain
for both the company and the investor. The classification of
these type of securities is unsettled with questions as to whether
the digital tokens are securities, commodities, or utilities. This
leads to concerns about actual investment outcomes for the
investors who range from the sophisticated to the
unsophisticated, and from the accredited to the non-accredited.
In Form C filings, companies are required to identify risks that
are specific to the business and its financial condition.178
Generally, companies disclose language relating to risks of an

175

Id. Hypothetically, an investor could invest $0.25 or larger dollar amounts
offered by issuers. Most deals have larger entry points for investment. For example,
although a share may cost $0.25 per share, a minimum contribution might be 100
shares, resulting in a $25 investment.
176
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012). See also
Regulation Crowdfunding Release Nos. 33-9974, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2018).
177
Business fundamentals might include: due diligence regarding the proof of
concept, a viable business plan, the leadership and human resources, the finances
and profitability, the product/service, promotion, and the place.
178
Form C, supra note 12.
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economic downturn, political events, and technological
developments (such as hacking and the ability or inability to
prevent hacking).179 Enhanced risks for early-stage companies
that are greater than the typical risk of a startup, are another
cause for concern.180
There are a variety of other types of information that are
retrievable from the data, including geographical data, choice of
entity, and principal office locations. Only a brief summary of
the data concerning geographic location of all investment
crowdfunding transactions is included in this Article. The scope
of the geographical investment crowdfunding data may have
broader implications regarding the reasons why capital blackouts
in certain areas around the country are occurring.
Also,
jurisdiction and principal office location is a robust topic, which
also can be covered in a broader research paper.
c.

Company Choice of Entity and Principal Offices

This research study did not retrieve incorporation or
organizational documents. However, what is apparent from the
Form C notice filings is that a larger concentration of companies
selected Delaware as the preferred choice of entity than in
2016.181 Choice of entity provides context to the law applying to
“the scope of directors’ fiduciary duties, permissible charter and
bylaw terms, and shareholder voting rights,” which are
considerations “controlled by the law of the state of incorporation,
regardless of whether the corporation has any real economic ties
to that location.”182 Empirical work on choice of entity also can
“illuminate how parties actually behave” and how the “parties

179

See, e.g., Mobile Spike, Form C Disclosure Questionnaire (Form C) (May 17,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1674319/000167431916000003/mob
ilespikeformc.pdf.
180
See Patrick McCarney, Note, False Start: Carving a Niche for Established
Small Business Participation in Regulation Crowdfunding Rules Designed for
Startups, 51 IND. L. REV. 277, 296 (2018).
181
See infra Part I.C. More research would be needed to determine the reasons
for this flight to Delaware. It could be a function of larger deals, herd behavior, or
other legal, business, and tax considerations. See also Magnuson, supra note 171, at
178 (explaining reasons for herd behavior in FinTech markets). “This may occur in
several different ways, but perhaps the simplest involves computer programs
sharing certain programming templates. If an algorithm proves successful in the
market, other actors may be tempted to simply copy or replicate the algorithm.” Id.
182
Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses
in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 597 (2016).
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would be likely to behave in response to legal rules.”183 Professor
Cherry notes that corporations engage in races to the bottom, not
only in selecting the jurisdiction of incorporation that will govern
their internal corporate affairs, but in labor and regulatory
considerations as well.184
In the context of digital coin disputes, choice of entity will
likely be an important jurisdictional question. Recently, the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cyan v. Beaver
County Employees Retirement Fund, permitted some claims
under the 1933 Act to be brought in state courts (as well as
federal courts).185 The private bar has predicted that there will
be a surge in state court actions asserting that ICOs contain
materially false information.186 A federal judge in the Northern
District of California recently cited Cyan.187 These decisions
provide state courts with some precedent to proceed on a variety
of claims brought by civil litigators, including claims under Rule
10b-5.188 Companies offering securities under Reg. CF are not
exempt from these securities law provisions, even though the
transactions are smaller in size. Consequently, there is a
growing preference toward a Delaware incorporation. Last, the
Reg. CF offerings are mostly concentrated as common stock,
simple agreements for equity, and convertible debt offerings,
with an emerging trend in digital tokens.

183
Kyle Chen et al., Empirical Study Redux on Choice of Law and Forum in
M&A: The Data and its Limits, 16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 31–32 (2016).
184
Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951, 960–61
(2011).
185
138 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (2018).
186
Nicolas Morgan et al., ICO Battlefields Proliferate: Preparing for Private
Litigation
and Regulation
Now, THE RECORDER
(Apr.
27,
2018),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2018/04/27/ico-battlefields-proliferate-preparingfor-private-litigation-and-regulation-now/?slreturn=20180813122201 (noting the role
of the private bar to “flesh out the application of long-standing legal concepts to the
novel issues raised”). See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Wildes v. Bitconnect
International PLC, No. 18-cv-80086-DMM, 2018 WL 4864836 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24,
2018).
187
Baker v. Dynamic Ledger Solutions, No. 17-cv-06850-RS, 2018 WL 656012
(N.D. Cal. 2018).
188
Morgan et. al, supra note 186, at 4 (“[T]he Cyan ruling not only gives
plaintiffs a choice of forums in Securities Act claims, but potentially allows for
multiple concurrent actions regarding the same ICO—an outcome that not only
leads to the potential of inconsistent rulings, but certainly will increase the cost of
defending this type of litigation.”).
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Investment Crowdfunding Generally

Studying the Reg. CF parties, funding portals, and offerings,
provides a better understanding of whether the normative goals
set forth by the Crowdfund Act have been attained. When we
consider what the data means, the conversation quickly becomes
normative. Is Reg. CF the best way for companies to form
capital? Is there a better way to create jobs than this current
investment crowdfunding framework? To the extent the data
defies our thinking about what is happening in investment
crowdfunding markets, without more research, we will not be
able to know for sure whether the positive story is as good as it
gets, because these small companies could not raise any more
money than they did under Reg. CF. Alternatively, is the
negative story (i.e. not raising more capital through Reg. CF)
merely the flip side of a positive story because companies not
using Reg. CF found other alternative financing opportunities to
their capital needs?
The next Section provides additional details about the data.
C. Shedding Light on Data
There appears to be a limited benefit in Reg. CF offerings,
which is illustrated in the next Section. What we know is that
investors have historically been able to invest in large
enterprises and those investments have produced both social and
economic benefits (and losses) for the companies and the
shareholders. That data is highlighted daily with disclosures to
the SEC, and articles in the Wall Street Journal, New York
Times, Forbes, and Barron’s. Further, what we also know is that
accredited and sophisticated investors have been able to invest in
companies that file under a variety of safe harbor exemptions
and under the 1933 Act but startups still have trouble raising
capital. Companies that have these investors available to them
could tap into other safe harbor exemptions and file under Reg. A
or Reg. D.
Consequently, it appears that the major benefit of Reg. CF
investment crowdfunding is to provide a place where companies
can reach into the general public of unsophisticated or
unaccredited investors.
If these companies had access to
sophisticated or accredited investors, they likely would file under
another safe harbor exemption. The fact that the general public
is solicited is one reason that regulators should evaluate what is
actually being offered to investors.
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Quantum Thought?

There is quantitative data and then there is the meaning
that we assert about the data. After reviewing the data, Nick
Szabo’s idea to simultaneously consider mutually contradictory
possibilities allows for skepticism in analyzing the data. Szabo
states:
[Q]uantum thought, as I call it—although it already has a
traditional name less recognizable to the modern ear, scholastic
thought—demands that we simultaneously consider often
mutually contradictory possibilities.189

The next portion of this Article sets forth the data of the
study. The terms that apply to them might vary depending on
the party interpreting the data. Is the idea that over $600
million was offered under Reg. CF a cause to celebrate or does it
show that Reg. CF offerings pale in comparison to the broader
ICO or IPO markets? When we look at the growth progression of
digital tokens, we could hypothesize that there is a 500% growth
in digital token offerings, year over year. Yet, the total aggregate
numbers of digital token offerings remain small in comparison to
investment crowdfunding generally or the larger ICOs. The
same reasoning could be applied to the data that relates to the
progress of funding portals throughout the country. Arguably,
more funding portals are developing across the nation. However,
there are pockets where there are no funding portals and some
funding portals primarily offer digital tokens, which may or may
not be the best investment for unsophisticated investors. Thus,
normative claims about what is happening are reserved for more
study and a better understanding that will come with time.
Below are a series of charts that capture the data from the
research study:

189

Nick Szabo, More Short Takes, UNENUMERATED (July 1, 2012, 10:47 PM),
http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2012/07/more-short-takes.html. Tom Robertshaw
states that to practice quantum thought, one is reminded that “no matter how
confident we are, we should be the first to question our own point of view” and
affirming statements of Nick Szabo, “we can be both for and against a proposition
because we can be ‘considering at least two significantly possible but inconsistent
hypotheses, or because we favour some parts of a set of ideas but not others.’ ”
Practicing
Quantum
Thought,
TOM
ROBERTSHAW
(Aug.
14,
2017),
https://tomrobertshaw.net/2017/08/practicing-quantum-thought/.
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FINDING A1: ESTIMATED $600 MILLION INVESTMENT
CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS 2016-2018
Chart 1 – Investment Crowdfunding All Reg. CF Offerings 2016 –
2018

May-Dec 2016 - $126.98 Million; Jan-June 2017 - $131.6 Million;
July-Dec 2017 - $173.36 Million; Jan-June 2018 - $215.5 Million
FINDING A2: GROWTH PROGRESSION NOTED IN 2017
Chart 2 – Investment Crowdfunding Reg. CF 2016-2018 Growth
Progression

May-Dec 2016 - $126.98 Million; Jan-June 2017 - $131.6 Million;
July-Dec 2017 - $173.36 Million; Jan-June 2018 - $215.5 Million
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FINDING A3: BY 2018, DELAWARE AS CHOICE OF
ENTITY PREFERRED
Chart 3 – 2018 Company Choice of Entity compared to 2016
Choice of Entity

Chart: *Pennsylvania and Virginia were tied for 7th place

FINDING A4: DELAWARE PREFERRED AS THE
CHOICE OF ENTITY FOR DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS
Chart 4 – 2018 Company Choice of Entity for Digital Token
Offerings
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From SAFE to Blockchain-Based Digital Tokens

In this section, we explore how digital tokens have been
characterized in the Reg. CF offerings between 2016 and 2018
and the scope of the offerings.
Companies included over $22 million of Reg. CF securities
offerings with tokens in investment crowdfunding offerings
beginning in November 2017 through June 2018. These new
digital token investment contracts have increased by 500%
starting in 2017 to 2018. Considering there were no Reg. CF
digital tokens in 2016, they have increased 2000% since 2016.
It is important to note that the vast number of digital tokens
offered throughout the United States are not offered under Reg.
CF. There is a larger spectrum of all Reg. CF campaigns, in
comparison to ICO campaigns.
Reg. CF digital token
transactions remain a small, albeit important, slice of capital
raising. To better understand this point, it is best to view the
spectrum graphically. Between 2016 and 2018, companies
sought to raise over $615 million under Reg. CF—of that amount,
$22.2 million related to digital tokens. Estimates graphically
illustrate that digital tokens currently are less than 3% of total
Reg. CF offerings.
a.

Growth of Digital Tokens in Reg. CF

FINDING B1: REG. CF TOKENS OFFERINGS SMALL
IN COMPARISON TO ALL REG. CF INVESTMENT
CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS
Chart 5 – All Reg. CF Offerings, $615 Million; Digital Token
Offerings, $22.2 Million; and All Other Reg. CF Campaigns
(Equity and Debt), $598 Million

Also, to understand the context of Reg. CF digital token
offerings in comparison to ICOs, the next graph illustrates that
the aggregate dollar amount of Reg. CF digital token offerings is
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exceedingly small compared to the aggregate dollar amount of
ICO offerings. In fact, Reg. CF digital tokens, representing over
$22 million in offerings, are less than .2% of total coin offerings.
FINDING B2: REG. CF TOKENS OFFERINGS SMALL
IN COMPARISON TO ICO OFFERINGS OF
$11.3 BILLION
Chart 6 – Composite of estimated coin offerings, including ICO’s
($11.3 Billion), All Reg. CF offerings ($620 Million) of which
digital token offerings ($22.2 Million) – Comparison

Considering this context, digital token offerings under Reg.
CF could be considered small in comparison to the movement
currently happening with ICOs. These small digital tokens are
providing early-stage companies capital to launch later stage
transactions.
During the first half of 2018, over $16.9 million of securities
were offered with digital assets tied to blockchain, otherwise
described as Reg. CF digital tokens. For the six-month period in
2018, there is a developing second phase of investment contracts.
In the first phase, investment crowdfunding transactions
included SAFEs and revenue-sharing instruments,190 giving
investors the right to future shares in a company. However, the
company may never receive a future equity financing or elect to
convert the securities upon such future financing. In addition,
the company may never undergo a liquidity event such as a sale
of the company or an IPO. If neither the conversion of the

190

See Wroldsen, supra, note 6, at 555, 569–70, 573–76 (discussing the offering
of revenue-sharing and SAFE instruments under Reg. CF); see also Heminway,
supra note 13, at 7.
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securities nor a liquidity event occurs, the purchasers could be
left holding the securities in perpetuity as long as the company is
in business. The securities have numerous transfer restrictions
and will likely be highly illiquid, with no secondary market in
which to sell them. The securities are not equity interests, have
no ownership rights, have no rights to the company’s assets or
profits, and have no voting rights or ability to direct the company
or its actions. If someone invests, he or she is betting that the
company will be worth more in the future.
It should be noted that many offerings are still in progress.
In Chart 7, the Author provides data as to the date and
maximum amount of the offering; the capital raised as of
November 30, 2018, the name of the company and the digital
token offered; and the company principal office location and the
choice of entity location.
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FINDING B3: DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS
GROWING MORE RAPIDLY IN 2018
Chart 7 – Reg. CF digital tokens offerings191
Amount of
2018
Offerings

$ 898,000

Capital
Raised by
Nov. 30,
2018

$171,287.00

Form
Filings (C/A
and
C-W)

Form C/A –
Extended
until
2018.Oct2

$1,070,000

-

Form C/AExtended
until 5/30/
2019
Reg. A Filed
for $20
Million
2018.Aug8

$1,069,999

$94,166.40

Form C/AExtended
until
2018.Sept5

$1,070,000

$1,070,000

$10,388.00

0*

Form C/AExtended
until
2018.Dec31

Withdrawn*
Form C-W
Filed

Name of
Company and
Digital Token

Dates
of
Token
Offering
(2018)

Entity
Choice /
Principal
Office

Indeco
Financial
Syndicate Inc’s
Debt Until
Securities Token
Offering
(DUSTO)

Jun.
28

Del./Va.

Item Banc Inc.’s
IBE Tokens
(IBE)

Jun.
18

S.C./S.C.

Dashing Corp.,
Inc’s
Dashing Tokens

Jun. 6

Del./Or.

Test
Foundation,
Inc.’s
Token Debt
Payable by
Assets

May
31

Del./Cal.

May
30

Del./N.Y.

Access Network
Labs, Inc.
Token Debt
Payable by
Assets

191
This listing of information does not include debt offerings of companies that
are not offering tokens in the original offer. See, e.g., Blockstack Token, LLC offering
$1.07 million on March 1, 2018 to raise capital with a debt offering; a target of $200k
at $1 price. Reg. CF Form C. Also, Unicoin Blockchain Inc., which is offering class B
non-voting common stock at $10 per share, with a minimum target offering of
$10,000 and a maximum offering of $80,000. Additional information regarding the
actual capital raised was retrieved from the Startengine website for Indeco, Indeco:
Offering a Crypto Asset That Fuels a Cleaner Economy, STARTENGINE,
https://www.startengine.com/indeco (last visited Feb. 21, 2018), and Witnet. See
Witnet, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/witnet (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
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$1,070,000

$16,581.00

$107,000

$22,290.00*

$1,070,000

$118,200.00

$1,070,000

-

$1,070,000

$29,800.00

$1,070,000

$122,487.00

$1,070,000

10,866.00

$1,070,000

$157,234

$107,000

-

Form C/A Extended
until
10/29/2018

Withdrawn*
Form C-W
Filed
Form C/AExtended
until
10/29/2018

Form C/AExtended

Form C/AExtended
until
2019.Feb4
Form C/AExtended
until
2018.Aug21

n/a

Form C/AExtended
until
2018.Dec31

n/a

TrustaBit,
LLC’s
TAB Tokens
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May
29

Del./Cal.

Time Token,
Inc.’s Preferred
Equity Time
(PET) Tokens

May
23

Del./Ariz.

CEN, Inc.’s
Basic
Intelligence
(BIT) Tokens

May
15

Del./Cal.

EventJoin,
Inc.’s
SAB Tokens

May
11

Del./Cal.

JWL Com, Inc.
JWL Coins

May 4

DE/Cal.

Citizen Health
Project, Inc.’s
MEDEX or
MDX Tokens

Apr.
24

Del./Miss.

Apr.
20

Nev./Nev.

GeoPulse
Exploration,
Inc.’s
CannCoin
Tokens

Apr.
20

Nev./Nev.

Fullmeta
Corp.’s
META Tokens

Apr.
20

Del./Utah

One Sphera Inc.
CC Tokens

2018] CROWDFUNDING & BLOCKCHAIN-BASED TOKENS

$106,998

$11,342.52*

$1,070,000

$80,141.00

$1,000,000

$15,550.00

$1,070,000

$152,741.00

$107,000

$27,040.68

$1,070,000

$36,700.80

$1,070,000

$1,069,983

$17,375,997

$2,113,166

881

Withdrawn*
Form C-W
Filed

FrToken, Inc.’s
CHIKN Tokens

Apr.
20

Del./N.M.

Form C/AExtended
until
2018.Nov3

Erndo, Inc.’s
Violet Tokens

Apr.
20

Del./Del.

Form C/AExtended
until
2018.Sept18

Supporter Inc.’s
SP Tokens

Apr.
19

Ga./Ga.

Form C/AExtended
until
2018.Sept10

MintHealth,
Inc.’s
Mintheath
Tokens

Apr.
19

Del./Cal.

Form C/AExtended
until
2018.Sept14

Crowdcoverage,
Inc.
COVR Tokens

Apr.
19

Del./Nev.

Form C/AExtended
until 2018.
July31
Form D filed
under 506(c)
for a $20
Million
Offering

EpigenCare,
Inc.’s
EPIC Tokens

Mar.
20

N.Y./N.Y.

Form D filed
for a $13.9
Million
Offering

Witnet
Foundation,
Inc.’s
WIT Tokens

Mar. 1

Del./N.J.

TOTAL
2018
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In 2018, most of the companies that raised capital by offering
digital tokens were primarily tech-related startup companies.
The type of tech-startups varied by the target clients, goods, or
service markets. For example, most of the companies identified
as funding portals or technology businesses seeking to develop
blockchain networks; six companies broadly identified as tech
companies with health, consumer health registry, or biotech
applications; one company was developing a platform for
cannabis sales; two developed web based marketing services; one
a jewelry product; tech insurance services; and another a tech
security company.
By contrast, during 2017, only four companies offered digital
tokens in offerings. The types of companies varied, from medical
records to sports (football), renewable energy, and solar energy
startups. All four 2017 offerings included investment contracts
and, in each case, a SAFT. Additionally, each of the four digital
token offerings is tied to the development of a blockchain
distributed ledger.
FINDING B4: DIGITAL TOKENS REPRESENTED
FOUR OFFERINGS IN 2017
Chart 8 – Reg. CF Digital Tokens in the 2017 Offerings
Amount of
2017
Offerings

$1,070,000

$1,070,000

Amount of
Capital
Raised 2017

$466,896

$1,068,600

Name of Digital Tokens
SAFT: Mission: To use
blockchain technology to
establish a better, more
secure and transparent
framework for Electronic
Medical Record that vastly
improves the quality of care
for patients and helps
reduce healthcare providers’
costs.
SAFT: Fanchise Tokens
Mission: Built on the
Blockchain and designed to
combine the passion of live
sport, the competition of
fantasy sports, the
engagement of video games,
and the global reach of
esports, the FCFL is the
first pro sports league truly
created for the digital age.

Date of
Token
Offering
(2017)

Entity
Name

Dec. 29

MedChain,
Inc.

Dec. 11

Fanchise
League
Company,
LLC
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$1,070,000

$106,450

$744,000

$172,287
Filed a Form
C/A to extend
the deadline
to
2018.Jan.18

$3,954,000

$1,813,233

b.

SAFT: Mission: a real-world
company building revenue
generating renewable
energy assets that is also
developing an Ethereumbased blockchain currency
platform. With the ability to
implement smart contracts
on a distributed ledger, the
Sun Fund token will bring
liquidity and a store of
value for renewable energy
assets while also helping to
disintermediate global
financial and energy
markets.
SAFT: Indecoin Tokens
Mission: To be astable
crypto assetfor stored value,
aninvestment vehicleand an
engine forthe expansion of
the clean economy,
including solar energy,
battery storage and smart
controls and sensors for
energy efficiency.Our
network will support four
independent roles with
distinct, interoperable
smart contracts.
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Nov. 17

Sun Fund
Renewables,
Inc.

Nov. 9

Indeco, LLC

Totals

Growth Compared to Other Capital Formation

FINDING B5: COMPARISON OF DIGITAL TOKENS
FROM 2017 TO 2018
Chart 9 – Reg. CF Digital Tokens under Reg. CF 2017-2018
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The locations of the principal offices of companies offering
securities under Reg. CF are set forth below. The principal
locations are western states, such as
California, Nevada,
Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Oregon. The next
grouping is companies with principal locations in Delaware, New
York, Connecticut, Virginia, Georgia, South Carolina, and
Mississippi. This research project does not address the reasons
why there is not participation in digital tokens by companies in
states outside of coastal areas.

FINDING B6: PRINCIPAL OFFICE LOCATIONS ARE
PRIMARILY LOCATED IN CALIFORNIA; THEN
DELAWARE, NEVADA AND NEW YORK
Chart 10 – Principal Office Location of Reg. CF Digital Token
Offerings
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FINDING B7: GROWTH PROGRESSION OF DIGITAL
TOKENS IS ACCELERATING IN LATE 2017
THROUGHOUT 2018
Chart 11 – Reg. CF 2016-2018 Growth Progression of Reg. CF
Digital Tokens

Chart: Zero campaigns in 2016; four campaigns in 2017;
twenty campaign2018.
3.

Funding Portal Intermediation Findings

One of the requirements of Reg. CF is that companies use a
funding portal to host the offering. The role of the funding portal
is best described in Werbach’s description of an intermediary:
What makes activity happen in this arrangement is the
intermediaries’ ability to aggregate activity on both sides.
Financial services relationships are a good example of
intermediary trust. Commercial banks sit in the middle of the
transaction flow between depositors and borrowers...Investment
banks structure and intermediate financial transactions in
capital markets.192

192

WERBACH, supra note 18, at 28.
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FINDING C1: REGISTERED FUNDING PORTALS
EXPANDED ACROSS THE COUNTRY
As of July 11, 2018, there were forty-three funding portals
registered to serve in that role for the companies offering
securities under Reg. CF.
These entities served the
crowdfunding market by providing structure for the transactions
over the past three years.
The chart below provides a listing of the top five funding
portals completing a majority of all of the investment
crowdfunding transactions for this period. There are two notable
inferences from this data. First, StartEngine Capital, LLC is
doing the lion’s share of the investment crowdfunding offerings,
which suggests that this particular funding portal has an
effective system for raising capital. Second, the number of
overall funding portals is increasing, but fewer funding portals
are conducting more offerings.
FINDING C2: FUNDING PORTALS CONSOLIDATED
OFFERINGS AND MORE FUNDING
PORTALS REGISTERED
Chart 12 – 2018 Jan - June Funding Portals By Number of
Offerings

During the prior six-month period from January to June
2017, StartEngine Capital, LLC, WeFunder, and SI Securities,
LLC were the three leading funding portals for investment
crowdfunding offerings.
Next, First Democracy VC and
OpenDeal, LLC also performed a number of transactions. From
January to June 2017, the same five funding portals hosted
offerings.
The principal funding portals that assist companies with
digital token offerings are Start Engine Capital, LLC, Open Deal,
Inc. d/b/a Republic, First Democracy VC, and truCrowd, Inc. The

2018] CROWDFUNDING & BLOCKCHAIN-BASED TOKENS

887

chart below illustrates just how many more offerings
StartEngine Capital, LLC is conducting compared to other
funding portals in the digital token space. Also, the chart
illustrates where most of the digital token offerings are hosted
and the pace at which they grew from 2017 to 2018. The funding
portal, StartEngine Capital, LLC is substantially greater than
any other funding portal, which calls into question the scope and
growth of Reg. CF digital tokens in investment crowdfunding.
FINDING C2: FUNDING PORTALS ACCELERATING
BUT CONCENTRATION IN FOUR FUNDING
PORTALS IN 2018
Chart 13 – 2017 - 2018 Funding Portals By # of Offerings for Reg.
CF digital tokens

4.

Terms and Conditions of Offerings

As might be expected in different industries, the descriptions
of SAFTs or other digital token investments can vary
significantly. For example, in the Fanchise Sports League, Inc.
digital token offering, the company provides its investors the
right to vote on games and provides an opportunity to participate
in a $1 million purse on football team winnings, based on the
number of digital tokens that the investor owned, however, this
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Reg. C-W offering was withdrawn.193 This right to vote on games
is unique to this particular transaction as it engages the investor
in the company’s games and allows them to potentially win when
their team wins. Another company, MedChain, would allow its
utility tokens to be “used within the network to purchase entry
credits facilitating Electronic Medical Record storage and access
control.”194
The right to actually receive a digital token or some other
non-security utility token varies by the offering. Most of the
2018 companies discuss the right to receive a future utility token,
contingent upon the company’s creation of a network based upon
blockchain and distributed ledger technology.195 Or companies
include other language, such as, “the right to receive future
utility tokens when and if the company creates a network based
upon blockchain and distributed ledger technology.”196 In some
offerings, the investors are allowed to choose whether they
receive back cash or a “possible” digital token. Some companies
state that only they will decide whether the investor receives
digital tokens, common stock, or other cash payment.
Voting rights also vary across transactions.
In most
transactions, the investor does not have voting rights in company
decisions. However, there are various decisions on which an
investor could vote, such as what new promotional events the
company could have.
For example,when Fanchise League
discusses the FAN Token Ecosystem, it states “[t]he Fan Access
Network and FAN Tokens are going to revolutionize the
experience of being a sports fan, and the FCFL will be the first
league built on and powered by the Fan Access Network.”197

193
Fanchise League, LLC Form C filed November 12, 2017 and Form C-W filed
April 30, 2018. Fanchise Sports League, Inc. also hosted a crowdfunding campaign
on Indiegogo which surpassed their $5 million ask by December 23, 2017. See FCFL,
https://medium.com/@FCFLio/fan-token-pre-sale-update-we-exceeded-our-goal-8559
ae2491b7 (last visited on April 8, 2019) (“Ten-day campaign was the first token sale
ever hosted by crowdfunding leader Indiegogo (in conjunction with MicroVentures)
and garnered attention from the likes of the New York Times, Forbes,
and CoinDesk.”). These offerings were to be followed up with a public digital token
sale for fans looking to gain early access to voting power in March or early April of
2018. See Fan Token Blog, http://blog.fantoken.network/frequenty/ (Dec. 28, 2017).
194
See MedChain, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last
visited on Feb. 21, 2019) (describing their SAFT offering).
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
The
Fan
Token
Ecosystem,
FCFL
BLOG
(Mar.
1,
2018),
http://blog.fantoken.network/fan-token-ecosystem/.
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FINDING C3: TERMS OF DIGITAL TOKEN
OFFERINGS HAVE VARIOUS TERMS
Chart 14 – Terms and Conditions of Digital Token Offerings
RIGHTS TO TOKENS

Right to receive future utility tokens based
on an uncertain future event (e.g. blockchain
and distributed ledger technology)

CONTINGENCY

Based upon the successful development of
Tokens, the company creates a network
based on the blockchain upon which the
Tokens function.

TIMING

Uncertain

EVENT

Optional, not guaranteed

VOTING RIGHTS

Tied to decisions of the company or decisions
related to other promotions and events of
the company;
Right to Vote on Games

PARTICIPATION RIGHTS

The right to participate in purses and team
winnings, based on number of Tokens
investor owns

DECISION FOR THE
CONTINGENT EVENT

The company

TOKEN AVAILABILITY

On wallets on open source and/or future
tradeable exchanges

TIED TO OTHER
SECURITIES

Common or Debt plus Tokens

REPAYMENT

In Tokens, Cash, Common Stock

REPAYMENT OPTION
DECISION TO RECEIVE
CASH OR TOKENS

Investor or the company
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II. CONCERNS WITH DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS
A.

What is Troubling About Digital Token Offerings?

Investment crowdfunding company offerings include a range
of common stock, convertible debt, tokens and coins offered to
investors.
The data infers that investment crowdfunding
offerings have led to mixed results and some troubling
developments. On the positive side, this research supports the
assertion that investment crowdfunding has had momentum,
even though still in its infancy. There is greater breadth in
publicly offered crowdfunding campaigns. Those campaigns can
be measured by the increasing numbers of company principal
office locations throughout the country, increasing amounts and
types of securities offerings, and an increasing variety of
companies that are participating. These amounts represent a
sizable expansion in investment crowdfunding under Reg. CF.
The next Section discusses the troubling concerns with digital
token offerings, which include uncertainty and risk, cancelled
offerings, and goals of Reg. CF that have yet to be attained.
1.

Uncertainty and Risk

The more troubling discovery from this research is the
accelerating movement of companies offering Reg. CF blockchainbased tokens to investors. These investment contracts include a
possible conversion to a token or coin that is distributable upon
the success of blockchain ledger technology.
The greatest
concern is the uncertainty of blockchain technology. To the
extent that companies are raising funds based on that success,
the likelihood of raising the necessary funds becomes more
speculative. Investment contracts with token conversions are
written such that risk is a given and that there is no guarantee
the services or tokens will ever come to fruition.
The Form C/A’s, C-U’s and C-W’s provide a picture of
companies that may be having difficulty raising capital on the
funding portal. Form C-U allows a company to extend the time
that it can seek funding.198 The first of the negative results
relates to companies that are not able to raise the funding that
they seek.

198

Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 5.
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When raising capital, businesses must fulfill their business
needs as well as stay apprised of changing regulations in order to
protect their investors and reduce legal liability. To the extent
that businesses successfully raise capital, but fail to appreciate
shareholder interests or potential liability, business losses and
securities and fiduciary liability can become real concerns. A
good example of this balancing is the case of Indeco Financial
Syndicate, Inc., which touts itself as one of the first companies to
file a registration for tokens under Reg. CF.199 On the same day
as the Indeco Reg. CF filing, the SEC froze the assets of another
company based in Quebec that had raised $15 million but failed
to register their token offering.200
An example of a more successful fundraising campaign is
Witnet Foundation, a Delaware company with a principal office
in the state of Washington. Witnet raised $1,069,983 from 688
investors by March 2018.201 One difference in this company’s
offering from typical Reg. CF and other securities offerings is
that instead of the company repaying its debt obligation with
cash, the company plans to repay the obligation with Wit tokens
and 20% interest.202
As Witnet and Indeco suggest, companies face a variety of
dilemmas in raising capital. On the one hand, a company seeks
to maintain a sustainable business venture. To do that requires
a basic accountability to their business plan while not being blind
to new innovation. A company must always perform the
necessary compliance in order to avoid state or federal regulatory
discipline. Innovation is believed to be the main driver of longterm economic growth in the United States.203 But innovation
includes uncertainty, which in turn, presents the dilemma for a
company in considering what possibly could go wrong. To that
end, a best practice would be to think of what could go wrong and
plan to minimize potential liabilities. However, minimizing

199

Indeco, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/indeco (last visited Feb.
21, 2019) (Indeco CEO David Levine is interviewed by Peter Armstrong on the CBC
show, “On the Money”); see also Press Release, Indeco, Indeco Launches First Token
Pre-sale under SEC’s Regulation Crowdfunding Rules (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://medium.com/indeco/indeco-launches-first-token-pre-sale-under-secsregulation-crowdfunding-rules-e82dad79345.
200
See DAO Report, supra note 116, at 16; Levine, supra note 156.
201
Witnet, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/witnet (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
202
Id.
203
Brian Kingsley Krumm, Fostering Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Shark
Tank Shouldn’t Be the Model, 70 ARK. L. REV. 553, 555 (2017).

892

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:833

liabilities may require not always giving the most valued
investors exactly what they may demand. Thus, the dilemma
hinges on how to harness investor satisfaction in an ever
technologically advancing society.
In Reg. CF capital formation, the ecosystem includes the
companies, the funding portals mandated by the SEC to be used
in these offerings, the employees, and the crowd. Companies
raising capital via Reg. CF are required to be assisted by funding
portals in their first steps towards “going public.” The SEC
requires that funding portals follow a variety of rules or be
subject to § 5(c) of the Securities Act and sections of the
Securities Exchange Act.204 Funding portals have additional
legal exposure and must make sure to comply with their own
registration requirements.205 To date, companies with token
offerings have been assisted by only four funding portals, while
overall, there were forty-three funding portals registered.
Companies that use Reg. CF have employees. As creating
jobs for employees is one of the normative goals of investment
crowdfunding, over the past two years, companies have disclosed
the hiring of over 5,300 employees, on average. The number is
smaller for companies engaging in token offerings, with an
average of 149 employees. The investors are also essential to this
ecosystem. Their particular interest in purchasing coin-based
securities/currencies may also be driving the demand for these
products. The good news about Reg. CF is that the current
financial movement drives an ecosystem for businesses to raise
funds, and hire employees. The downside is that the token frenzy
may wane, which may lead to unemployment in the long term.
There are risks to investors also. Worst case, investors will
be left with shiny coins to satisfy the obligations and the
companies would be left to ward off future disputes.
204

See SEC v. Muehler, No. 2:18-cv-01677-CAS(SKx), 2018 WL 1665637, at *1
(C.D. Cal. 2018) (granting the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the
defendant in a case “assert[ing] claims against defendants for (1) violations of
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) . . . for (2) violations of
Sections 10(b), 15(a), and 20(e) of the Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) . . . 78t . . . and for (3) violations of Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5”).
205
The SEC must demonstrate a prima facie case that defendants have violated
§ 5(c) of the Securities Act. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act makes it “unlawful for
any person . . . to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a
registration statement has been filed . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012).
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One solution to enhanced risk and potential investor
dissatisfaction is to provide robust and clear offering disclosures.
Although difficult to do when funding is needed, companies must
recognize that due diligence requires a long-term view, which
includes paying close attention to funding that has a low
probability of repayment. Further, state and federal securities
agencies can be helpful by providing clarity on the allowance or
disallowance of certain types of securities. Tokens are just the
latest development in a type of security or reward offered. We
can only imagine the outer limits of virtual securities to come.
One difference in Reg. CF digital tokens is that there are
notice filings with the SEC. Because of that fact, token-funded
companies are likely to be more cautious than companies that
either are not registering because they do not think they are
offering a security, or because they are trying to circumvent the
law. This difference may play out with fewer matters involving
fraud, manipulation, and deception, than may be found with
unregistered ICOs.
However, what is more troubling is the complexity of the
offerings and the open question of whether these investors have a
basic understanding of what they are buying. This part of the
story will continue to unfold as companies provide disclosures to
their buyers as time goes on. With respect to companies, the
warning signs are present.
There is volatility in current
blockchain-based transactions that are currently trading. If the
company succeeds, then they not only have successfully raised
capital, but will also have potentially happy investors. To the
extent that the company does not meet its mission of successfully
creating a token utility, commodity, or security, and the token
fails to meet the goals of the offering, then those companies
would be best served by thinking about the alternative plan to
the failure of the offering, which makes Professor Heminway’s
assertion so relevant here.206 As we are in an age of alternative
entities, alternative finance, and alternative facts, it behooves
companies, their advisors, investors, and the agencies that have
oversight over these transactions, to think long and hard about
the responsibility we have to each other and to ourselves.

206

Joan MacLeod Heminway, Professional Responsibility in an Age of
Alternative Entities, Alternative Finance, and Alternative Facts, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L.
227, 256, 259 (2017).
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Should we be troubled by the development that Reg. CF is
being used for pre-coin token offerings as a leverage to other coin
offerings?207 Rather than failing to register, companies are
engaging in digital token transactions that are exempt from
registration in light of the regulatory uncertainty. This part is
understandable as a company would want to avoid securities
liability and unintended consequences.208 But the Reg. CF
offering may be just a means to another larger digital token
offering end. Arguably, that leverage is a good thing.
The greater inclusion of pre-token/coin conversions raises
long-term sustainability concerns for companies and long-term
viability concerns for investors. The existence of digital token
offerings under Reg. CF—albeit small in number and relatively
insubstantial in dollar value as compared to the total number of
Reg. CF offerings and the total number of ICOs—raises many
questions for companies and investors.
What are the
considerations for companies in choosing Reg. CF digital tokens
and how should investors respond? To the extent that companies
are relying on the § 4(a)(6) exemption from registration, should
these types of coin offerings and sweeteners be registered as
ICOs? What limits should the SEC set to protect the crowd from
bearing the brunt of the risk of valueless cryptocurrency
207

See DAO Report, supra note 116. The SEC recently investigated The DAO
organization, which sold DAO tokens to fund investments. Id. The founders
described it as a "crowdfunding contract" to raise funds to create a company in
crypto space. Id. at 4. The press release notes that although crowdfunding was used
to describe the design, it would not qualify for an exception under Regulation
Crowdfunding because the platform or organization was not registered as “a brokerdealer or a funding portal.” Id. at 4 n.11.
208
There are very few cases/matters relating to investment crowdfunding
company violations or controversies. However, Allen Hydro Electric Corporation
related to the offering of debt securities through “an online equity crowdfunding
website.” In re Allen Hydro Energy Corp., No. 17-028, 2017 WL 4325088 at *1 (Ohio
Dept. Commerce 2017). The Ohio Department of Commerce found that the
Corporation had several violations of Reg. CF. Id. at *1–*4. The violations in the
Consent Agreement included: a failure to follow the disclosure requirements; Allen
Hydro Electric’s “[b]usiness [p]lan did not have a reasonable basis in fact”; and they
failed to follow proper procedures. Id. at *2. In light of these violations, Respondent’s
crowdfunding attempt did not qualify for the crowdfunding exemption. See id. at *3.
Additionally, the SEC issued several Comment Letters to Worthpoint Corporation
and Sagoon, Inc. See generally Letter from Jeanne Campanelli, Partner, KHLK LLP,
to Barbara C. Jacobs, Assistant Director, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec.
23, 2016) (SEC digital archives). The SEC noticed there was an offer to exchange
common stock purchased under Reg. CF for other shares. See id. Both companies
stated that it was to "grant those shareholders the greater informational rights and
ability to freely resell their shares that Regulation A provides, and place all the
company's shareholders on an equal footing." Id.
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repayments or convertible instruments that may never convert to
equity or anything of value? Will the SEC abdicate authority to
the extent that companies disclose that risk of loss to the
investing crowd is great or will they intervene to set parameters
on this new blockchain-based token movement? It is predictable
that if businesses fail, investors will feel taken advantage of, thus
creating heightened legal risk for companies.209
2.

Inadequate Disclosures

Another negative indicator in the Reg. CF crowdfunding data
is that the disclosures may comply with the requirements of
securities law, but still fail the investors.210 The reasons may
have to do with the inability to portray through disclosure the
level of risk that is involved in investing in the particular
company.211 This is even truer in the case of blockchain-based
token offerings under Reg. CF.212 Most governmental agencies
have a difficult time explaining the risks for purchasing a
blockchain-based token, let alone a startup company working
with a group of advisors, funding portals, and employees new to
this technology.213 Most unsophisticated investors would not
likely have the background to understand the terms of these
offerings.214 Even though the disclosures may appear adequate,
it seems unlikely that investors would understand whether it is
likely or unlikely that they will ever receive a digital token and
whether the company is able to implement its version of smart
contracts on the blockchain.215 This leads to the third negative
indicator, which relates to where those disclosures, or lack
thereof, leave unsophisticated investors.

209
Two questions, not addressed in this Article, relate to the uncertainty of
blockchain’s success as most of the ICO or Reg. CF offerings are tied to the
blockchain. Further, the strength or flaws of the company’s business model are also
important.
210
See Hinman, supra note 3.
211
See id.
212
See id.
213
See John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act:
Zuckerberg, Saverin, and Venture Capitalists' Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 604 (2013).
214
See id. at 605.
215
See id.
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Investors in Limbo

Before the recent crash of coins, it may have been difficult
for investors to think clearly with so many varying reports of coin
purchasers profiting in large amounts.216 It sounds good, but
investors should understand the distinctions between companies,
services, offerings, timetables, and terms and conditions, because
these terms can have an adverse effect on them. The worst case
is that an investor spends hard-earned cash on a company’s
capital campaign and loses her money. The likely case is that an
investor will be left in limbo wondering whether the company’s
goods or services will ever allow for a token to be issued and
exchanged on some future distributed ledger.217
An illustration of investors in limbo is evident in frequent
postings by investors who purchased Indeco Dusto digital tokens.
Several months after Indeco exceeded its minimum capital
request, raising over $171,000, investors began to ask about the
progress of the development of the digital tokens and the
blockchain. Below are the string of posts (as included on the
StartEngine website) between a frustrated investor and the
company on the StartEngine funding portal website on
November 30, 2018:218
Potential Investor, 6 months ago
Still no peep. The writing seems to be on the wall and yet I saw
Indeco continues to sell the theoretical tokens at a discount on
other forums. I should have known better.219

Around a month later, a company representative responds:
Indeco – Issuer, 6 months ago
Hi [Potential Investor]—we’ve been focusing on building out the
platform and qualifying for our Security Token Offering with the
SEC. It’s a brutal process.
Now that we’re solidly in business, with revenue and technology
(no longer a theoretical company), I’ll be in closer touch.
You should have my personal email address as I’ve sent notes to
all investors in the past. Feel free to contact me directly. Happy
to give investors my cell # as well.

216

Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 506-07.
Id. at 507–08.
218
Indeco, Comments, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/indeco (last
visited Feb. 22, 2019).
219
Id.
217
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When we pull off the STO, you’ll be glad you invested. :)
David220

A couple of months later, the Investor inquires again:
Potential Investor, 3 months ago
Have not have [sic] much communication other than the post
below related to the status of the SAFT investment. The March
2019 deadline is coming up where are [sic] SAFTs could
potentially become worthless. Is the company on track to issue
tokens soon or before the deadline? The lack of communication
and updates makes it seem as if the company is waiting until the
expiration date so that the SAFTs expire worthless. I have
reached out many times on the Indeco website and through this
platform asking for updates and have never received a response
to my e-mails which does not give me confidence in the project
being successful. I think many SAFT investors would like some
communication on the status of this investment with the
expiration date coming up. Also if the expiration date in March
is reached does the company plan on extending the deadline per
the provision in the SAFT agreement or will the company let the
SAFTs expire?221
Potential Investor, 3 months ago
Is anyone from the company ever going to reply back and give us
s [sic] recent update? I have reached out through the portal and
the company web[s]ite numerous times. Starting to think are
[sic] money is gone... shouldn’t be that hard to get s [sic] response
from someone.222

Around a month later, a company representative responds:
Indeco – Issuer
The SAFTs will not expire. They’ll be converted to tokens.223

4.

Cancelled Offerings

Another troubling concern is that not all companies have
successfully raised funds through these digital token offerings, as
some have been cancelled. Some companies fail to raise the
capital needed for their emerging enterprises. However, to the

220
221
222
223

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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extent there is uncertainty about the outcome of digital token
transactions, the lack of participation could be a good thing for
the potential investors and possibly the companies.
Not
investing minimizes or eliminates the higher transaction risk
based on blockchain technologies. On the other hand, if
companies can raise capital and grow successful businesses,
providing needed services and goods to the community, then the
failure to participate in Reg. CF investment crowdfunding will
impact the potential economic growth for years to come.
Three companies withdrew from their Reg. CF digital token
offerings during the time period of this Article. One example is
Access Network Labs, Inc., a Delaware incorporated company
located in New York, which launched a token debt asset
offering.224 Access Network had a noble goal of “[c]reating access
to financial and technological tools for the word’s [sic] 1.7 billion
unbanked adults through the development of a sustainable
decentralized bank.”225
The minimum funding goal was
$100,000, with a minimum investment of $50 in return for an
Access Token.226 Their maximum funding goal was to raise $1.07
million.227 Access Network Labs had a breakdown for the token
sale: 30% of the tokens were dedicated to growing the branchless
banking infrastructure and user base; 30% of the tokens were to
be dedicated to rewarding the development of applications; and
the remaining were tokens towards the sale (21%); founding
team (12%); community rewards (3%); and advisors (4%).228
However, after initially amending the offering, the company
withdrew the offering on July 27, 2018.229

224
Access Network Labs, Inc., Offering Statement (Form C) (May 29, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739626/000173962618000001/formc.pdf
(offering Token DPA, Series S-a DPAs (Debt Payable by Assets), 100,000 units at a
$1.00 price).
225
Access Network, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/access-network (last visited
Feb. 22, 2019).
226
Id.
227
See id.
228
See id.
229
EDGAR Search Results, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/c
gi-bin/browse-edgar?CIK=1739626&owner=exclude&action=getcompany (last visited
Feb. 22, 2019); see also Access Network, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/access-network
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019) (showing caption of “Access Network has withdrawn their
campaign.”). The reason for the withdrawal is not listed on the website. Id. A
withdrawal could also indicate a retooling or finding capital through another exempt
or non-exempt offering.
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Two other companies withdrew their digital token offerings
during this period. Time Token, Inc. had a principal office in
Arizona and was incorporated in Delaware.230 On May 23, 2018,
Time Token sought to raise $107,000 for its goal of merging
blockchain technology with vacation rental real estate, to bring
liquidity to the vacation rental market.231 Their digital tokens
were called Preferred Equity Tokens (“PET”).232 However, by
September 9, 2018, Time Token withdrew its offer to sell PET
tokens to the general public after raising over $22,000.233 A third
example was Frtoken, Inc., a company based in New Mexico and
incorporated in Delaware.234 Frtoken offered a CHIKN Token on
April 20, 2018 with phrases, to include a decentralized
blockchain-based platform that allows companies to pay
audiences directly for watching ads and answering surveys.235
The CHIKN token represented a single share of Series B
Common Stock of this company.236 After raising $11,000 of the
$107,000 maximum funding sought, then filed a Form C-W and
withdrew the offering on October 1, 2018.237
It is also possible that these companies underestimated the
costs or potential liabilities. In the case of Frtoken, they raised
over the minimum ask of $9,000,238 which in this regulatory
environment, may not have been enough to remain sustainable.
It would take additional research to determine why these
companies were not successful in their crowdfunding campaigns.
The top four most common reasons that a company fails are that
there was no market need for their goods or services; they simply
ran out of money; they didn’t have the right team formed; or they
lacked the proper competitive advantages to continue with the
business.239 Timing of offerings is also important, and to the
extent that the offering does not go well, that may present
230

Time Token, Inc., Offering Statement (Form C) (May 23, 2018).
Id.
232
See Time Token, Progress Update (Form C-U) (Aug. 30, 2018).
233
See id.; see also Time Token, Offering Statement Withdrawal (Form C-W)
(Sep. 7, 2018).
234
Frtoken, Inc., Offering Statement (Form C) (Apr. 20, 2018).
235
Id.
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Id.
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Frtoken, Inc., Offering Statement Withdrawal (Form C-W) (Oct. 1, 2018).
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Id.
239
Triin Linamagi, The Most Common Reasons Startups Fail, FAST COMPANY
(Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3044519/7-of-the-most-common-reas
ons-startups-fail (noting some companies run out of cash before they are able to
raise the funds).
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problems for the company. However, it is also possible that a
withdrawal could indicate a retooling or landing alternative
capital from a private source.
5.

Crowdfund Act Goals Yet To Be Attained

In light of the research findings, it is highly questionable
whether the normative goals of the Crowdfund Act have been
fulfilled. There is still much work to be done on the two goals of
encouraging small business growth and furthering employment,
specifically to “help entrepreneurs raise the capital they need to
put Americans back to work and create an economy that’s built to
last.”240
There are two reasons for this concern.
First,
considering investment crowdfunding’s potential as a
decentralizing, democratizing tool, that has not happened.241
With more encouragement and decreased costs, we may see more
activity.
Second, the rapid growth that is occurring in
blockchain-based tokens shares similarities with the proliferation
of unsound mortgages in the 2008 mortgage debacle. One must
hope that this trend will turn out differently. Also, there are
geographical considerations that have impacts on the future
success of capital formation. Some areas of the country are not
participating in either investment crowdfunding generally, or in
the more specialized digital token offerings.
6.

Alternative Financing

For companies, theoretically, there are a variety of
financings that would be available for amounts under $1
million.242 Some of the most common alternative financing
measures for financing up to $1 million include friend and family
financing, bank and government loan financing, factoring, and
peer to peer lending.

240
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama
to Sign Jumpstart Our Business Companies (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012)
(https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/president-obamasign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act).
241
Rohr & Wright, supra note 21, at 466–67.
242
See DONALD F. KURATKO, ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY, PROCESS, PRACTICE,
SOURCES OF CAPITAL FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES 232 (2008); see also Lee,
supra note 7, at 68–69.
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Friends and family financing is defined as funding from
members of the business owners’ family and friends who provide
loans for debt or cash for equity in the company.243 Family and
friend’s contributions are additional to cash and other
contributions provided by the owners, themselves (commonly
called bootstrapping).244 This early stage financing is not
discussed in this Article, since it is typically provided at the early
stages of the business and not in this growth cycle of the
business.
Bank and government loans are a traditional way for a
business to get capital by obtaining a loan from their bank,
community development organization, small business investment
company, or other lender.245 The business can also seek a
guarantee of their loan from the Small Business
Administration.246
“Factoring is the outright purchase of a business’
outstanding accounts receivable by a commercial finance
company or ‘factor’ ” at a rate typically between 70% and 90% of
the receivable at the time the company purchases it.247
Peer to peer lending is a means for a borrower to get a
cheaper loan than the banks and credit card companies offer
through a peer to peer network. “Websites such as Prosper and
Lending Club . . . function like a bank loan officer, taking loan
applications, checking credit scores, employment and debt levels.
These peer to peer networks state that theyreject 90 percent of
applicants. Lending Club, for instance, requires a minimum
FICO score of 660, above the national average credit score of
690.”248
For companies with excellent credit ratings, access to
accredited and sophisticated investors, or angel networks, other
alternatives may be available, such as angel investments,

243

See Lee, supra note 7, at 50.
Id.; see also JEROME KATZ & RICHARD P. GREEN, III, ENTREPRENEURIAL
SMALL BUSINESS 500–01 (2014).
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Id.
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Id.
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Tom Klausen, The Difference Between Factoring and Accounts Receivable
Financing, ALLBUSINESS, http://www.allbusiness.com/the-difference-between-factor
ing-and-accounts-receivable-financing-14847411-1.html (last visited on Mar. 9,
2016).
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Jim Gallagher, Is Lending to Strangers Smart Investing?, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Jan. 27, 2013), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/is-lending-tostrangers-smart-investing/article_7f79bb0b-5c6a-5399-a4b3-f352ba8fc877.html.
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venture capital financing, private placements and initial public
offerings. It is unlikely that the companies availing themselves
of financing under Reg. CF, have these tools available to them.
B.

Positive Findings

1.

Some Companies’ Successful Offerings

A positive outcome of investment crowdfunding was that a
number of successful offerings occurred during this time period.
On April 6, 2018, Wellbeing Brewing Company, LLC, a St. Louis
based company organized in Missouri, conducted a Reg. CF
crowdfunding offering.249
The company sought to raise a
minimum of $125,000 up to a maximum of $200,000 and provide
investors convertible notes paying 6% interest, which would be
payable by April 6, 2023.250 The company’s goal is to create a
healthy craft beer for customers who do not drink alcohol.251 This
novel customer product was well received by investors, which
allowed Wellbeing to raise $199,000 from seventy investors and
successfully close their offering within three months’ time.252
Wellbeing conducted its offering via Nvsted.253 Nvsted is a St.
Louis Regional Economic Development Partnership which
developed
a
funding
portal
through
its
website
Nvstedwithus.com.254
MedChain, Inc., a Delaware incorporated company located in
Colorado, quickly became oversubscribed for its offering of a
minimum of $10,000 of common stock with a SAFT to a
maximum of $1.07 million.255 The company seeks to develop a
249
Wellbeing Brewing Co., Offering Statement (Form C) (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1731872/000173187218000002/formc.pdf.
250
Id. See also WELLBEING BREWING COMPANY, https://wellbeingbrewing.com/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
251
Wellbeing Brewing Co., Offering Statement, supra note 249.
252
NVSTED, https://nvstedwithus.com/ (last visited March 7, 2019).
253
Brian Feldt & Jacob Barker, St. Louis Economic Development Partnership
Launches Nvsted, a New Crowdfunding Platform, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr.
18, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/st-louis-economic-developmentpartnership-launches-nvsted-a-new-crowdfunding/article_e539c20c-04c8-5475-85a9cfc87e25bd13.html.
254
Jacob Barker, St. Louis Economic Development Partnership Launching
Crowdfunding Platform, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/st-louis-economic-development-partnershiplaunching-crowdfunding-platform/article_50f3a1bf-7564-5e38-b2c6f8b54b130193.html.
255
MedChain, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last
visited Feb. 22, 2019); see also MedChain, Offering Statement (Form C) (Oct. 7,
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“community-driven solution” to the growing field of electronic
medical records and electronic protected health information.256
Although the company did not raise the maximum amount
sought, after raising $466,896, MedChain closed the offering to
additional investors.257
Another example of a successful offering is Farm from a Box,
Inc.258 Farm from a Box, Inc. is a California benefit corporation,
incorporated on February 6, 2012, with principal offices located
in San Francisco.259 This company has developed an innovative,
modularly designed farm system that provides tools and
technology needed to support a two-acre off-grid farm. The
company manufactures and sells its farm system to consumers
and large-scale buyers with the hope of connecting communities
to healthy, sustainably grown food, and revolutionizing local food
production.260 They initially set SAFEs261 with funding goals of a
minimum amount of $25,000 and maximum amount of
$535,000.262 However, they amended their offering amounts to
$100,000 with a greater maximum of $999,999 in a later Form
C/A filing.263 Although not their maximum target goal, the
company ultimately raised $148,999 from 240 investors and

2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1726640/000166516018000130/
xslC_X01/primary_doc.xml (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
256
MedChain, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last
visited Feb. 22, 2019).
257
Id.
258
Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited
Feb. 22, 2019).
259
Farm from a Box, Amendment to Offering Statement (Form C/A) (July 21,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1679373/000167937316000006/
FFABformC.pdf; see also FARM FROM A BOX, www.farmfromabox.com (last visited
Feb. 22, 2019).
260
FARM FROM A BOX, https://www.farmfromabox.com (last visited Mar. 7,
2019); see also Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last
visited Mar. 7, 2019); Farm From a Box, Annual Report, (Form C-AR) (May 1, 2018),
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1679373/000167937316000006/FFABformC.pdf.
261
The SAFEs were called Crowd Safe, an investment contract between
investors and companies, wherein the investment is “in exchange for the chance to
earn a return—in the form of equity in the company—if it’s acquired or has an IPO.”
How the Crowd Safe Works, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/learn/investors/crowdsafe
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019). The Crowd Safe was developed by the Platform Republic.
Id.
262
Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited
Feb. 22, 2019).
263
Farm from a Box, Amendment to Offering Statement (Form C/A) (July 21,
2016) (identifying an offering deadline of December 16, 2016).
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concluded their first campaign in March 2018.264
As this
company is a startup with a bold idea, they will continue to need
capital, which suggests there is still risk for their initial
investors.265
For companies that sought to form capital with digital
tokens, there were two of note that leveraged the Reg. CF
offering and continued to raise greater levels of capital. Item
Banc, Inc., is a tech company located and organized in South
Carolina that is supporting basic human need products in five
categories: food, building materials, basic clothing, paper
products, and hygiene.266 On June 18, 2018 Item Banc offered
$1.07 million under Reg. CF of IBE Tokens to the general
public.267 This offering occurred after the company had filed a
notice of exempt offering under Reg. D Rule 504.268 In August
2018, after one extension request on the previous filings, Item
Banc amended the earlier filings and filed a Form 1-A with Reg.
A disclosures about its $20 million offering of IBE tokens.269
EpigenCare, Inc., a digital biotech company, located and
organized in New York, leveraged the initial Reg. CF filing
immediately following a Reg. D Rule 506(c) offering.270 On March
20, 2018, Epigen, Inc. filed both a Form C to offer $1.07 million of
EPIC Tokens and a Form D to offer $20 million of the tokens.271
In a later Form C-U filing, Epigen, Inc. reported that it did not
meet its maximum goal of raising over $1 million under the Reg.
CF.272 The company was able to raise over $36,700 under Reg.
CF and continued to raise funds from accredited investors in the
Reg. D filing.273
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Item Banc, Amendment to Offering Statement (Form C/A) (June 14, 2018).
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EpigenCare, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Mar. 20,
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EpigenCare, Inc., Offering Statement (Form C) (Mar. 20, 2018).
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EpigenCare, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Mar. 20,
2018).
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Coastal Dispersion and Preference

Other ways to measure the scope of investment
crowdfunding include evaluating the geographical distribution of
the company transactions; the choices of entity made by the
companies; and offering characteristics. Over the two-year
period that this Article focused on, changes have occurred. The
most pronounced changes relate to a diffusion in intermediation,
concentration of the offerings geographically, a preference toward
incorporating or organizing LLCs in Delaware, and a normalizing
of the types of securities offered.
The bulk of digital token offering financings are mainly
located on the west coast. The geographic distribution, set forth
in this study, illustrates the regional divide with respect to
investment crowdfunding, and even more so, in digital token
transactions, where offerings essentially are developing on the
west coast.274
This coastal concentration in digital token
offerings and funding portal dispersal nationwide appears to be
similar to what Professor Magnuson called “diffusion” in the
FinTech Markets.275 This dispersal illustrates pockets of digital
token offerings concentrated within two to four funding portals,
but a wider variety of funding portals and offerings nationwide.
While this investment crowdfunding study did not look at
incorporation or organizational documents, what is apparent
from the Form C filings is that there is more concentration of
companies selecting Delaware as the preferred choice of entity
than in 2016.276 These choices of entity seem related to “the
scope of directors’ fiduciary duties, permissible charter and bylaw
terms, and shareholder voting rights”—which Professor Lipton
states “are controlled by the law of the state of incorporation,
regardless of whether the corporation has any real economic ties
to that location.”277 Empirical work on choice of entity has also
“illuminate[d] how parties actually behave” and how the “parties

274

See id.
See Magnuson, supra note 171, at 163–65.
276
More research would be needed to determine the reasons for this flight to
Delaware. It could be a function of larger transactions, herd behavior, or other legal,
business, and tax considerations. See id. at 178 (explaining reasons for herd
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would be likely to behave in response to legal rules.”278 Professor
Chen’s study contradicted the fact that business corporations
that heavily favored Delaware as the state of incorporation
actually preferred New York for choice of law and forum in the
context of merger agreements.279
3.

A Business Disruption?

“All business disruptions begin with business innovations.”280
There are several reasons that investment crowdfunding may
contribute to business disruption and innovation. First, as CFTC
Commissioner Quintenz claimed, digital tokens “hav[e] and will
continue to have, an impact on title transfer and settlement
processes,” or otherwise a “back office tokenization revolution.”281
There is a belief that “digital assets are here to stay.”282 It will be
just a matter of time before digital ledger technology will be able
to verify entries between parties and scale to the proportion
required for continuous use.
What is more unlikely is that smart contracts will alleviate
the need for middle men and women, until there is a potential
reduction in transaction costs and regulatory costs.283 Just
recently, when the cost of Bitcoin dropped below the support level
of $6,000, pundits argued that the market price for Bitcoin could
drop to $0 because the mining transaction cost would be more
than the potential investment.284 This suggests that beneath the
blockchain layer, there are middle men, and without social or
economic incentives, it is unclear how the blockchain sustains
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itself without drivers. It is evident that theoretically, smart
contracts can allow self-regulation without third party
intervention.
Second, as Reg. CF offerings are growing, the need for a
company to seek venture capital and angel investor funding may
be replaced by this new mechanism for financing.285 Arguably,
the manner in which investment crowdfunding may disrupt
these markets depends on the continued success of Reg. CF.
Commentators argue that there are several ways venture capital
could be disrupted by investment crowdfunding: actual
democratization of access to capital; the traditionally
underfunded can become successfully funded by this new access
to capital; and that there is a proliferation of companies that do
not seek the same exit and end goals as venture capitalists.286
There has been no sizeable disruption in investment
crowdfunding, digital tokens, or in capital formation as of this
writing. Again, the story of business disruption and innovation
will take some time to determine if companies, the marketplace,
investors, and the communities, are measurably changed because
of the offering of the variety of securities under Reg. CF. In the
event that companies are able to create a fully viable digital
token reliant on blockchain technology, that endeavor could be an
innovative business disruption.
FINDING D1: BUSINESS DISRUPTION IS LIKELY IF
DIGITAL TOKENS RELIANT ON THE BLOCKCHAIN
ARE REALIZED
There is one way that Reg. CF digital tokens are disrupting
the investment marketplace and one way they are not. One
positive disruption is that these offerings can leverage other,
future ICOs. This development may provide potentially good
disruptive qualities to the investment marketplace depending on
the success of blockchain technology.
On the other hand, there appears to be no disruption outside
of the coastal areas and larger cities throughout the county. For
example, funding portals generally have some control over what
offerings are hosted nationally. The idea that a novel innovation
in the state of Montana could find capital through and connect to
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See Marks, supra note 3, at 2.
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investors interested in this idea is unlikely. Reg. CF financing is
not yet democratizing capital and innovating in that manner.
Second, there are a host of traditionally underfunded individuals,
groups, neighborhoods, and companies that have yet to benefit
from new blockchain-based technologies. Unless there are better
ways to connect the traditionally underfunded with funding
portals and structures, that disruption has yet to evolve. Third,
currently, the data suggests that companies currently offering
capital are still connected to the idea of exit strategies. Most
notable are the companies that are reliant on blockchain as a
business strategy and the likelihood that the business concept
will obtain further investment after the initial investment under
Reg. CF. Thus, Reg. CF is not yet disruptive in these positive
ways.
What advocates of capital formation would not want is to
have an adverse disruption occur. To the extent that investors
begin to invest in poorly conceived or speculative investments,
this activity could have a negative effect on attracting new
investors to these markets. This could lead to effects similar to
those witnessed during the housing mortgage crisis of 2008,
where a large influx of participants in the market faced dire
consequences when the market collapsed. The concern is that
investors not be put in a similar position as investors and
purchasers in 2008. The next Part provides some solutions to
these troubling developments in digital tokens.
III. LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE
Six hundred million dollars seems like a significant amount
of financing. However, that figure pales in comparison to ICOs,
Reg. A, Reg. A+, Reg. D, 1933 Act IPOs, and other capital raising
alternatives. Although this research does not quantify the unmet
business need for capital nationwide, the initial normative goals
were to help entrepreneurs and to grow employment nationwide.
At the same time, the idea that investors may lose their
investments is not a positive tradeoff for capital formation and
employment.
In light of the research, this Article provides
recommendations for a path forward. The first relates to actions
that the SEC should consider immediately.
The second
suggestion is for companies to consider. The last provides
suggestions for economic development organizations.
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SEC Re-Evaluation of Reg. CF

The first recommendation is the most difficult to frame. On
the one hand, if the SEC regulates too much, then innovation in
new types of securities and capital formation can die. On the
other, if the SEC regulates too late, then they are reacting to a
worst-case scenario where investors have already lost their
money and companies are potentially liable The SEC must
balance the time and manner in which it regulates. That being
the case, first, the SEC should re-evaluate whether Reg. CF will
be able to attain the goals of job creation and capital formation,
in light of the current status of investment crowdfunding and the
ongoing sales of SAFTs and digital tokens. Unfortunately, this
solution will ripen only after the investment crowdfunding
campaigns discussed in this Article have concluded and other
metrics have concluded, such as the expiration of the blockchain
development and a period of time to evaluate the sustainability
of participating companies. Potential evaluation time periods
could be a first step after the offering period ends for all
companies with offerings through June 30, 2018. How much
capital did these particular companies raise? The second step
would be to evaluate the success or failure of the companies that
offered digital tokens reliant on blockchain development. Did
these companies accomplish their goal and did they provide
investors with digital tokens? The third step would be to
evaluate the success of these companies after a minimum fiveyear period to determine whether the companies are sustainable
or facing financial difficulties, in the worst case, bankruptcy.
These evaluation steps will provide great information for the
SEC.
In the short term, the SEC should publish detailed guidance
for unaccredited and unsophisticated investors. Much of the
SEC’s attention has been directed towards unregistered ICOs
and IPOs with material misstatements sold to accredited
investors.
As the proliferation of Reg. CF digital tokens
continues and there is no certainty in blockchain technology, it is
imperative that the SEC provide guidance directly to smaller
investors intrigued by Reg. CF coin investments. Current SEC
guidance is helpful, but while the language typically references
ICOs, it does not distinguish between the ICO market and Reg.
CF transactions. Shareholders might think that the warnings
regarding ICOs do not apply to them. However, as companies
are getting their first batch of funding from small investors
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before advancing to ICO markets and venture capital funding, it
is important for the SEC and investment advisors to educate
those small investors who may be taking the greatest investment
risk. More guidance may deter what happened when investors
purchased synthetic collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”)287 or
“mortgage-backed securities that lost value when the housing
bubble burst.”288 In that advisory, the SEC must clarify its
position on Reg. CF digital tokens for these investors.
Alternative financing options may be considered an ideal
solution for the investors who will read the materials, but not so
much for those who do not. That being the case, there would be a
greater chance that some investors would properly weigh the risk
of loss to their own financial situation. Better yet, if these
investors had advisors, the advisor could assist them in better
understanding the terms and conditions in which they plan to
invest. One cannot underestimate the level of potential loss in
these offerings.
B. Issuers Should Weigh Other Financing “Alternatives”
Companies, particularly those that are tipping into tokens,
should thoughtfully consider alternatives to Reg. CF digital
tokens.
There remains a level of speculation in these
transactions, which could result in liability or greater risk than
the alternative financings. Companies should fully consider a
backup plan in the event of an unsuccessful token asset offering,
whatever the reason for the failure.289 Although investment
crowdfunding shows signs of being an innovative bridge to
capital, this Article notes some developments that raise
uncertainties for companies and investors.
Some of the inferences are encouraging, and raising $600
million is a good start. However, other aspects of the scope of
investment crowdfunding transactions, such as the escalation of
digital assets in Reg. CF transactions, show some warning signs.
Lawmakers, scholars, and industry representatives should
continue to closely monitor this rapidly growing development to
help foster a healthy, inclusive, and efficient expansion of
company capital.
287

Jennifer O'Hare, Synthetic CDOs, Conflicts of Interest, and Securities Fraud,
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288
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289
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Companies should carefully weigh “alternatives” to the coin
alternative of raising capital. To the extent that the company
has no clue what a cryptocurrency or blockchain is, they should
consider alternatives to this form of investment. It is possible
that developing a new digital asset to be traded on the blockchain
is exactly what that company needs to grow its business. That
decision comes with due diligence and the right partners to help
form the right strategies for the business.
C. Economic Development Organizations Lead the Alternatives
Nvested is an excellent example of an economic development
organization partnering with others to develop a funding portal
to raise capital for companies in the state of Missouri.290 After a
successful campaign to launch Wellbeing Brewing, LLC, the
funding portal announced recently that it is available to launch
other offerings for companies.291 To realize the goals of capital
and job creation, economic development organizations would
seemingly play a greater role in expanding opportunities for
companies to connect with potential investors.
Dozens of states are not participating in Reg. CF offerings.
The question as to why that is may be a function of other
alternatives that are available to companies in non-participating
states, but also may be a need for organizations to develop
funding portals that are ready, willing, and able to assist with
the launching of these offerings. If it is not the will, what
appears to be missing in states that are not participating is the
way to participate.
That is where economic development
organizations can play a significant role in this new method of
capital formation.
CONCLUSION
This research study provides a snapshot of investment
crowdfunding’s broadening scope as a vehicle for capital
formation. Part II discussed what success under Reg. CF would
be. It suggested that success would be: companies engaged;
companies raising capital; and investors with a likely potential of
a return on investment. Using that success metric, the results
290

Nvstedwithus.com is a website owned and operated by STL Critical
Technologies JVI, LLC and is registered as a funding portal with both the SEC and
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). See also Felt & Barker, supra
note 253; Barker, supra note 254.
291
NVSTED, https://nvstedwithus.com/raise-funds (last visited on Feb. 22, 2019).
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are mixed. As parts of the story are still unfolding, the final
story of company/investor success or failure remains to be told.
However, what we can glean from the study is that companies
are engaged in capital campaigns using Reg. CF.
Some
companies have been able to raise capital, while others continue
to fail. Investors, however, are seemingly at risk of losing their
investments as the securities are developing and reliant on
theoretical ideas. Time will tell whether those who were the first
to invest in blockchain-based digital tokens will be successful or
not.
To recap, with respect to the types of securities offered, one
can label this emergence as either troubling or a looming disaster
that is waiting to happen. The offering of blockchain-based
tokens is novel, but selling these securities to unsophisticated
and non-accredited investors is not ideal in the best case, and a
travesty, in the worst case. These concerns give traction to
scholars who have expressed concerns about the type of securities
that might be offered under Reg. CF. When Reg. CF was
adopted, digital tokens were not initially conceptualized at the
time of the approval of the regulations. The great uncertainty of
these securities adds to the concern that startup companies will
not succeed with their business goals and will not raise the boats
of investors along with the communities they seek to serve.
However, there are encouraging developments in Reg. CF
investment crowdfunding. First, there is an expansion of a
variety of securities markets for the crowd to invest in companies
as they so choose. There is an availability of an assortment of
investments that allow the crowd to capitalize enterprises. And
more companies are able to avail themselves of a public access to
capital with their first step towards “going public.” In addition,
funding portals are developing across the country and providing
a technological solution for fundraising campaigns.
The investment crowdfunding phenomenon of securities
digitally offered to the public has the potential to disrupt both
the way companies capitalize their business and the manner in
which funding portals and the crowd support these companies.292
292
See WALES, supra note 17, at 218 (discussing global securities crowdfunding);
Schwartz, supra note 14, at 889 (“Securities crowdfunding, while born in the United
States, has become a worldwide phenomenon, with New Zealand leading the
charge.”); see also Zachary J. Robins & Timothy M. Joyce, How to Crowdfund and
Not Fall Flat on Your Face: Best Practices for Investment Crowdfunding Offerings
and the Data to Prove It, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1059, 1073–90 (2017)
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As Reg. CF offerings are growing, the need for companies to seek
venture capital and angel investor funding may be replaced by
this new mechanism for financing to a degree. Arguably, the
manner and extent to which investment crowdfunding may
disrupt these markets depends on the continued success of Reg.
CF, blockchain technology, and the interest of investors.
It is argued that there are three ways venture capital could
be
disrupted
by
investment
crowdfunding:
actual
democratization of access to capital; traditionally underfunded
venture capital can become successfully funded by this new
access to capital; and exit and end goals of companies diverge
from venture capitalists.293 However, considering these three
reasons the data does not reflect any sizeable disruption at this
time.
A final concern is whether investment crowdfunding could be
disruptive in a negative way. To the extent that investors begin
to invest in poorly conceived or speculative investments and lose
their money, this activity could have a negative effect on future
investors in the marketplace. To ensure that investors do not
revisit the devastation of the mortgage crisis of 2008, caution is
the word of the day. Still, the possibility of a future being
recreated by the successful development of blockchain technology
is not a bad dream to have.

(including a review of selected data after the first anniversary year 2016 and
recommendations on best practices for companies and lawmakers). The types of
ventures seeking capital are quite diverse: health/fitness, technology, restaurants,
liquor, gaming, cryptocurrencies, and movie production companies. Id. at 1076.
293
See Marks, supra note 3, at 3–6.

